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Abstract: 
Through research on the contemporary debates and studies pertaining to Glen 
Canyon Dam, this paper objectively addressed the proposal to drain Lake Powell. This 
thesis reaches a conclusion that advocates decommissioning the Glen Canyon Dam. This 
paper approaches the concise, yet multi-dimensional question of whether or not to drain 
Lake Powell by most basically weighing the benefits and costs of both keeping and 
removing Lake Powell through an analysis of the effects on various parties. The areas of 
interest in which existing empirical data is available in order to sculpt a comprehensive 
and supported opinion that will simply answer the central question are: logistical 
feasibility of such a proposition, adverse effects on power generation, sedimentation, 
water supply and distribution, recreation, and ecology (especially fish). On the subject of 
hydroelectric power produced by Glen Canyon Dam it is prudent to not decommission 
the dam, for a clean and cheap power source with peaking capabilities would be 
eliminated. Because sediment will eventually fill in the lake and is always increasing the 
time to a restored Glen Canyon, I advocate draining Lake Powell. The use of Lake 
Powell as a storage facility will not be realized for some time and increased evaporation 
from the lake also supports the movement to decommission the dam. The fact that 
recreation will continue in the Glen and Grand Canyons in the absence of Lake Powell 
aligns with the motion to drain Lake Powell, and the ecological harm that is a result of 
the Glen Canyon Dam (both within Lake Powell and in the Grand Canyon) is yet another 
reason to support decommissioning the Glen Canyon Dam. By analyzing the various 
aspects of the above categories in respect to a proposal to drain the contents of Lake 
Powell, This paper responds in favor of decommissioning Glen Canyon Dam.  
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Preface 
My personal experience with the West, Lake Powell, and even the Colorado 
watershed as a whole, stretches back to before memory. Born to an outdoor family of 
particular water-lovers, I have rarely let a year pass without spending a week on Lake 
Powell. I have experienced it in all of the ways popular to tourists: weeks on houseboats 
far away in secluded side canyons, camping trips from a speed-boat, day excursions from 
the base of a motor home, rented double-wide trailer, or hotel room, guided tours of Glen 
Canyon Dam, and just scenic drives to admire the lake from afar. In addition, I have 
played in the lake on houseboats, water ski boats, wakeboard boats, jets skis, tubes, 
surfboards, and more. In short, I have experienced intimately and extensively what Lake 
Powell has to offer and therefore, a major part of what the Glen Canyon Dam has to 
offer, although, as will soon be evident, impacts of the dam stretch far beyond the shores 
of Lake Powell.  
 From the above brief history of my Lake Powell experiences, it would seem that 
the lake and the dam have provided me with nothing but happiness. Another form of 
prominent outings within my upbringing, however, has turned out to instill beliefs in me 
that directly conflict with many of the principles of Lake Powell. Again, since my fourth 
birthday, it has been a yearly necessity to go whitewater rafting. Just like my many and 
varied experiences on Lake Powell, I have been a passenger on commercial and private 
rafts, as well as rowed both types, kayaked, inflatable kayaked, guided, paddle boated and 
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paddle guided, on over 13 rivers spanning two continents. So much has river rafting been 
a part of my life that I have spent recent summers as a guide, showing the beauty of 
Dinosaur National Monument to many ecstatic and awe-inspired clients.  
I reveal all this, not to revel in my fortunate outdoor experiences and 
accomplishments, but to set up the dichotomy that has ultimately led to this paper. Any of 
the over two million annual (McKinnon, 2007) wakeboarding, waterskiing, boating, 
fishing, or traveling enthusiasts who visit Glen Canyon National Recreation Area will 
light up at the mention of Lake Powell, for it is a tourist’s Mecca to enjoy such above-
mentioned recreation in a very unique setting. However, at the same time, any rafting or 
river lover will surely cringe at the mention of Lake Powell that drowned the pristine 
Glen Canyon, or hiss at any allusion to a dam, especially enormous dams that erase and 
alter rivers forever. Having witnessed this situation from many different vantage points, 
in the past years, I have frequently asked myself the most central question in the most 
unbiased manner: should Lake Powell be drained?  
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Introduction 
 With over 1,900 miles of shoreline, Lake Powell is an unusual sight in a 
landlocked arid region of the Southwestern United States. This landmark that some love, 
and others hate, is the result of the Glen Canyon Dam, a 710 foot tall concrete barrier that 
when full can hold back 26, 215,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water (Martin, 1989). 
Millions of people find nothing but beauty and enjoyment in the deep blue water and 
scoured sandstone cliffs that make up the National Recreation Area stretching 186 miles 
behind the dam. Others, who may have no direct experience with the lake itself, also find 
the resulting hydroelectric power from the turbines within the dam to be an essential 
source of clean energy in the West. However, as alluded to, still others despise the giant 
barrier and the consequences of the lake it creates, both ecological and interest-based. In 
the contemporary period in which environmental movements have a say in every issue, 
and even have the power to back up their opinions in the arena of popular politics, a 
motion to undo past actions is gaining momentum. A discussion to essentially turn back 
time by draining Lake Powell is never far away from any conversation about the lake or 
the dam.  
 When Glen Canyon Dam was under way in 1957, no thought was given to the 
health of an ecosystem or of the environment. No legislation existed that mandated 
environmental considerations be raised before the government embarked on any project, 
and it would be another decade before such laws were introduced in the United States. 
Instead, the Glen Canyon Dam was constructed on the heels of a large dam building 
frenzy by an enormous engineering machine, The Bureau of Reclamation. When it was 
built, the Glen Canyon Dam served all of its intended purposes and still does, to some 
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extent, today. Authorized to store water for future use by the Lower Basin states and 
provide hydroelectric power to a booming West, the Glen Canyon Dam’s other benefits 
included recreation and flood control (Rogers, 2006). Now, after more than 40 years in 
operation, the Glen Canyon Dam still stores precious water for downstream consumption, 
and continues to produce emission-free hydropower, yet sedimentation and evaporation 
have cut into the amount of water that can be stored in Lake Powell, and environmental 
concerns have led to reduced hydropower output. The recreation opportunities above and 
below Glen Canyon Dam continue to thrive as well. 
Now that the environment has a voice and a following in society, however, 
curiosity leads us to question if Glen Canyon Dam should have been constructed in the 
first place. In many such questions, the answer is trivial, as the realistic possibilities of 
decommissioning most of these impressive construction feats are slim. In the case of the 
Glen Canyon Dam, however, the possibility of removal is grounded and feasible, while 
constantly gaining support. It is for this reason, the plausible nature of decommissioning 
Glen Canyon Dam, that the ensuing debate must be carefully considered, for we are 
presented with a rare instance in which past mistakes or ill-informed decisions of such 
magnitude can be reassessed and possibly reversed. By investigating power generation, 
sedimentation, water supply and distribution, recreation, and ecological effects of the 
Glen Canyon Dam and the projected changes in the absence of Lake Powell, I will form a 
conclusion of the future of the Glen Canyon Dam.  Before this can be accomplished, 
though, background on the issues surrounding the dam, and on the dam itself, is 
necessary to set the stage. 
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Background 
Large Dam Enthusiasm 
 Within the core values of the famed notion of Manifest Destiny that shaped 
America’s frontier expansion is the recognized need to break away from the feudal past 
of Europe (Smith, 44). In no other way is this idea more evident than the enthusiastic 
large-dam-building period in America that essentially lasted until the completion of the 
Glen Canyon Dam in 1963. It was in the vast expanses of the “untamed” West, however 
that some of the most notable dams were erected. Prior to 1869, the American West was 
“a land that could not be plowed, grazed or even crossed” (Ward, 2004), a symbol of 
nature’s few remaining and undomesticated wilderness areas that changed beginning with 
the famous expeditions of John Wesley Powell. In 1869, Powell, a dogged Civil War 
veteran, finally navigated the last blank pieces on Western maps, via the Green River to 
the Colorado River and then down through Glen Canyon, and the Grand Canyon to end at 
the confluence of the Colorado and Virgin River in Southwestern Utah over three months 
later.  
This monumental expedition, as well as others that followed, convinced Powell of 
the fact that too little water existed in the desert West to transform the arid frontier into 
an eastern model of tamed farmland. The water that was present, Powell contended, 
existed in such remote locations and sporadic seasons that “water and land had to be used 
in common, with the federal government taking the lead in building dams where they 
would do the most good” (Ward, 2004). Although Powell’s rationale was based on 
meticulously observed scientific data and humbling personal experience that revealed to 
him the improbability, if not sheer scale, of an effort to cultivate the West in a traditional 
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Eastern or European manner, the relentless thirst of a new nation built on capitalism and 
insatiable expansion knew only one solution: the big business of big dams. Powell’s 
vision (one that is not explicitly agreed upon today) advocated a radical shift in basic 
political and farming practices in order for progress and settlement to be achieved in the 
unique situation of the West. Yet, his advice and foresight have been used to fuel sharp 
opposition. Dam builders institutionalize the waters of the West in Powell’s name, citing 
his call for federal aid in Western water infrastructure, while dam opponents imagine 
Powell turning in his grave upon seeing the immense barriers and projects that 
irreversibly alter the ecology of the rivers he loved and unsustainably support a 
civilization in a hostile climate (Ward, 2004). 
 In an era of engorged human ingenuity and plentiful public works projects, 
however, water in a thirsty land became a lucrative market and the powerful constituency 
behind those willing to capture this water was uncontested (Ward, 2004). As a result, the 
era of large dam building began. In 1888 the 140-foot tall Lower Crystal Springs Dam in 
central California was completed and still stands to this day (U.S. Geological Survey, 
2003).  Structures such as the Elwha Dam and the Glines Canyon Dam plugged 
Washington’s Elwha River in 1913 and 1927 respectively (NPS.gov). Other dams over 
100-feet tall also began to dot California and the Pacific Northwest in the early twentieth 
century.  
 By 1902 pressure on the Federal Government was mounting to shoulder storage 
and irrigation projects. The growing population that was moving west had realized that 
inadequate precipitation beyond of the 100th meridian required the use of irrigation for 
agriculture. Therefore, the Reclamation Act of 1902 sought to “reclaim” arid lands—for 
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the purpose of farming—and do so on a large scale with resources that were only 
available at the federal level. In the five years after 1902, the Reclamation Act had 
spurred 30 projects western states, with many more to come (USBR.gov).  
The CRB was developed first with the monumental success of Hoover Dam in 
1936 and many dams later, capped off with the completion of Glen Canyon Dam and the 
formation of Lake Powell, on the same river in 1963. It is ironic that America’s obsession 
with building Western dams began and ended on the Colorado River, as if the Glen 
Canyon and Hoover Dams are “monumental parentheses enclosing America’s era of big-
dam building” (Ward, 2004), as author Chip Ward astutely puts it. Yet, this way of 
highlighting such a period in history also points to the significance of a river like the 
Colorado in a region such as the arid West.  
 The above summary is a glimpse at how the West’s water came to be developed 
by massive infrastructure, interstate compacts and, for the purpose of this debate, large 
dams. Numerous instances of controversy have characterized the water development in a 
land opened to the world by John Wesley Powell. For decades, engineers have exacted 
their wills upon temperamental Western rivers in the name of Powell, but recently, 
opposition to such federal creations has also adopted the legacy of Powell to support their 
concerns. However, from this point forward I will narrow my focus to one large dam in 
particular, the Glen Canyon Dam, in an attempt to separate the convoluted facts in the 
argument to maintain or drain Lake Powell.   
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Glen Canyon Dam 
Colorado River Compact 
In order to understand the desire behind removing the Glen Canyon Dam, 
knowledge of how the dam came about is necessary. The Colorado River, running over 
1,400 miles through the arid American West, is possibly the most regulated river in the 
world. Ever since John Wesley Powell first explored the river, its precious water in the 
midst of a desert landscape began to be appropriated all around the developing West. At 
first, riverside settlements in the upper reaches of the watershed began extracting water 
for municipal and agricultural uses; however, before long, swelling urban centers as well 
as prosperous farming regions began to haul more and more Colorado River water farther 
away from its desert canyons and streambeds. In 1922 the Colorado River Compact 
marked the beginning of numerous pieces of management literature that have sought to 
equitably share the river basin’s valuable and contested resource. The 1922 Colorado 
River Compact allocated every last drop of water in the river to the seven basin states: 
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, California, and Nevada, as well as 
some to the country of Mexico (Water in the West, 1998). Since then, a host of legal 
stipulations have grown to dictate the management and operation of the Colorado River, 
totaling twelve major, and many minor, federal and state laws, treaties, court decisions, 
and compacts that are commonly referred to as the “Law of the River.”  
The most fundamental agreement that governs the Colorado River Basin (CRB), 
however, is the Colorado River Compact of 1922. In this document, the Colorado River 
system is defined as the Colorado River itself and its tributaries. The Colorado River 
Basin, however, encompasses all of the area drained by the Colorado River System as 
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well as other lands on which waters of the Colorado River System are beneficially 
applied (USBR Report, 2005). The Colorado River Compact of 1922 also divided the 
Colorado River Basin into the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin at Lees Ferry, located on 
the main branch of the Colorado River in Arizona (River Compacts, 2003). Ecosystems 
and watersheds are typically divided to conform to political boundaries and functions. 
The CRB is no exception and was artificially divided in two. The Upper Basin states are 
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, while California, Nevada, and Arizona 
comprise the Lower Basin states. The impetus for proposing the 1922 compact arose as 
the Upper Basin states realized the rapid growth occurring in such Lower Basin states as 
California and became concerned that any storage on the river would be put to immediate 
use by booming downstream regions. Lower Basin states would therefore be able to 
claim “first come, first serve” appropriative water rights (Burness, 1980), effectively 
securing Upper Basin water in times of drought. It is clear why the more slowly 
developing Upper Basin states would seek provisions to ensure water for future growth. 
Therefore, the basis of the 1922 Colorado River Compact lies in the difficulty 
encountered as both the Upper and Lower Basin states attempted to more equitably share 
the limited water that they had.  
Prior Appropriation 
 Furthermore, the antiquated and unique doctrine of prior appropriation plays into 
the allocation of the Colorado River. Contrary to doctrines of riparian water rights 
employed in the rest of the U.S., the laws governing water rights in the West were 
tailored in an attempt to address the hydrologic and social differences at work in the far 
more arid CRB and elsewhere. The Common Law riparian water rights observed in the 
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more humid eastern U.S., allows for “reasonable” withdrawals by riparian residents, or 
those living near the water and using the water, and assumes a high rate of return flows 
back into the watershed that can then be reused downstream (Burness, 1980). Water use 
in the dry CRB, however, is dominated by irrigated agriculture, a water intensive act with 
very low return flows back into the Colorado River. Therefore, Western water users long 
ago established the unique doctrine of appropriative rights to determine the destination of 
Colorado River water. Appropriative water rights are obtained by physically diverting 
water and putting it to beneficial consumptive use.  Much of the controversy surrounding 
the appropriative water rights doctrine comes from the priorities that are determined on a 
“first-come, first-served” basis (Burness, 1980). Whoever began to extract and use the 
water of the Colorado River first, in the appropriative rights doctrine, is entitled to use the 
water for the longest in times of reduced flow.  
Colorado River Storage Project 
 With a sense of the importance of the Colorado River to stakeholders in the West, 
and some knowledge about the urgency of guaranteeing water for future use, the 
Colorado River Storage Project can be introduced. The Bureau of Reclamation was 
charged with appropriating the now divided Colorado River water (Ward, 2004), and first 
did so in an impressive manner. Hoover Dam, constructed in Boulder Canyon where the 
Colorado exited the Grand Canyon and meandered into Nevada, was finished in 1936 and 
was revealed as an engineering marvel. In fact, the Glen Canyon Dam site was 
considered while looking for a place to build Hoover Dam, but was eventually ruled out 
due to being too far away from roads and potential water and electricity users (Ward, 
2004). Instead, Boulder Dam, later renamed Hoover Dam, was a massive success in the 
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views of both the public and the Bureau of Reclamation, so much so, that the era of large 
dam building began. After Hoover Dam, the Upper Basin voiced its desire for water 
projects. As a result, the Bureau of Reclamation designed the Colorado River Storage 
Project in the early 1950s in which “four dams and reservoirs would be raised—one at 
Bridge Canyon on the Colorado just downriver from Grand Canyon National Monument; 
one above Lees Ferry in Glen Canyon; one on the Green River at Flaming Gorge, by the 
Utah-Wyoming border; and another on the Green River, in Dinosaur National 
Monument’s Echo Park” (Ward, 2004).  
 The prospect of the Grand Canyon and much of Dinosaur National Monument 
disappearing under reservoirs was enough to spur David Brower and the fledgling Sierra 
Club into bitter opposition. In a battle that ultimately propelled the Sierra Club into a 
powerful and prominent organization that in turn spearheaded the environmental 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s, Brower stood up to the Bureau of Reclamation. The 
compromise that was eventually reached was a Colorado River Storage Project with dams 
in Flaming Gorge and Glen Canyon; the Grand Canyon and Dinosaur National 
Monument were preserved (Ward, 2004). Before the National Environmental Protection 
Act of 1970 (NEPA) existed to require an assessment of the environmental impacts of 
building dams, or Brower even had a chance to visit the marvelous Glen Canyon that he 
sacrificed in order to save two other beautiful sections of river, the Glen Canyon Dam 
was begun in 1957. 
 In order for the massive undertaking of building a 710-foot tall dam in an utterly 
remote location to become reality, a new community had to spring up from scratch to 
support those involved in the project. According to the U.S. Geologic Survey, in the 
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1950s, the Glen Canyon Dam site existed quite literally in “the most isolated area [with] 
the fewest people, fewest roads and fewest settlements, in the nation” (Alaska was still 
just a territory) (Martin, 1989). Nonetheless, people and supplies poured into the desert 
from around the country, and in some cases, the world, many having secured lucrative 
and unique contracts from the U.S. government. Among the vast array of contracts that 
the Bureau of Reclamation entered into while building Glen Canyon Dam, ranging from a 
contract to supply 100,000 gallons of lubricating oil to the 2.4 million dollar contract to 
Mountain States Construction for the job of carving out the diversion tunnels, was the 
prime contract for the construction of the dam and power plant themselves. The lowest 
bidding company that walked away with this task, was construction giant Merritt-
Chapman & Scott, who believed that such a structure could be built for a mere $107,955, 
522, a number $28,044,478 less than the Bureau had estimated, and more than $10 
million shy of the bids from the other two construction conglomerates in the hunt 
(Martin, 1989). Whether or not a profit was in store for Merritt-Chapman & Scott, in 
early June of 1957 Glen Canyon Dam was under way, and with it was the construction 
and growth of Page, Arizona, the future town that would grow from a temporary 
construction camp located on a bargained-for Navajo mesa perched on the east bank of 
the dam site (Martin, 1989). Many tons of dynamite and even more concrete later, in 
1963, Glen Canyon Dam was closed and Lake Powell reservoir began swallowing Glen 
Canyon, a process that took seventeen years to complete (“River and Dam Management”, 
1987). 
 The ten-million ton concrete plug in Glen Canyon was the fourth highest gravity-
arch dam in the world. Such a behemoth that was built to last for a thousand years 
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ultimately demanded five million barrels of cement, ten million cubic yards of aggregate, 
three million board-feet of lumber, 130,000 tons of steel, 20,000 tons of aluminum, 5,000 
tons of copper, and a workforce that topped out at 2,500 men, all meticulously put 
together in a little less than seven years (Martin, 1989). The Glen Canyon Dam houses 8 
massive turbines that can produce up to 1,296,000 kilowatts of hydropower. This 
electricity is sold to 1.7 million people in Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, New 
Mexico, and Nevada (Report to Congress: Operations of Glen Canyon Dam, 2001). The 
actual concrete structure of the Glen Canyon Dam however, would be the cause of little 
upheaval if it weren’t for the 186-mile long reservoir that backs up behind it, and it is this 
man-made sea that ultimately outrages conservationists.  
 
Lake Powell 
 Lake Powell is the direct result of the Glen Canyon Dam and therefore the origins 
of the two creations, the dam and the lake, are identical. It is Lake Powell, however, that 
is either a menace or a gem to those concerned. The reservoir lies within Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area, a 1.2 million acre stretch of high desert landscape in southern 
Utah and Northern Arizona (Friends of Lake Powell). The term “national recreation area” 
that was already given to the region surrounding Lake Mead, can be interpreted as “a 
designation applicable to public lands that were neither wild nor undisturbed but 
nonetheless offered particular opportunities for outdoor enjoyment” (Martin, 1989). 
Although the waters of Lake Powell cover only 13 percent of Glen Canyon National 
Recreational Area, the lake is the major draw to the area’s over three million visitors each 
year. In fact, the average tourist stays in Glen Canyon National Recreation Area for 4.5 
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days, the longest average of any federal park (Friends of Lake Powell). Something is 
enticing such crowds to the man-made, watery playground of Lake Powell, and upon 
visiting the area the lure is clear. Some 95 majestic side canyons await exploration by 
anyone with a watercraft or a desire to hike, and the “stained, striped, orange cliffs of 
spalling Navajo sandstone” (Martin, 1989) contain a deep blue oasis in the midst of the 
nation’s last frontier. A man-made object as beautiful as Lake Powell would seem a 
success to most. This is especially so when one realizes that due to the houseboats or 
hotels of tourist-thirsty Page, AZ, countless more people who never would have made the 
trip to the isolated natural beauty by mere way of river or extensive desert trek now enjoy 
the area. In short, the existence of Lake Powell allows many more people to experience 
the beauty of the region, even if the way in which this splendor is enjoyed includes jet 
skis and twelve-packs.  
 Those in opposition to the lake, on the other hand, do not see the appeal of a 
unique region that is now accessible via an engineering marvel. Yes, if the lake were a 
natural wonder in the middle of the desert Southwest, then these ardent environmentalists 
who condemn Lake Powell would be able to recognize it’s allure. But instead, the 
population that detests Lake Powell can see right to the bottom of the deep Glen Canyon, 
through the hundreds of feet of Rocky Mountain water, and recognize that the river that 
once flowed there, and the side canyons that are now drowned, encapsulated 
magnificence far surpassing that of Lake Powell. This sentiment, along with the adverse 
impacts of the lake, and in ways the dam, provides the basis of the movement to drain 
Lake Powell and thus the basis of the analysis in this paper.  
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Sentiment Towards Dams 
 
 In the midst of the struggle to erase the Echo Park Dam from the Colorado River 
Storage Project it seemed to those few who had ventured into the majestic Glen Canyon 
that an overlooked gem in the American West was being hastily sacrificed in order to 
save the Green and the Yampa rivers above Echo Park. Prior to the attention that the dam 
brought, Kenneth Sleight was certainly the most recurrent visitor within the sandstone 
confines of Glen Canyon and it was his fondness of this unseen canyon that prompted 
him and a few of his fellow outdoor activists at the University of Utah to form the 
Friends of Glen Canyon (Martin, 1989). Sleight’s fledgling group attempted to focus 
some attention on Glen Canyon, but in reality, represented a concern for a place that was 
voiced to soon to reach a substantial audience with a vested interest in the canyon. Sleight 
firmly contended that, “it was absolute insanity to drown nearly 200 miles of canyon just 
to generate a little electricity, just to make sure you could send water on downstream, a 
direction in which it so far had exhibited no trouble in traveling” (Martin, 1989). Yet it 
was not until the fate of the canyon was sealed and construction on the dam had begun 
that more people began to experience Glen Canyon. Certainly Sleight, like many others, 
never wanted to see Glen Canyon flooded in the first place, however, his creation of 
Friends of Glen Canyon as an attempt to draw attention to the place that the 
conservationists seemed strangely comfortable with losing can be directly linked to the 
first dreams and the later calls to remove the dam.  
Enticed by what was soon to be lost, and perhaps lured by the faint propaganda of 
Sleight, novelists Edward Abby and friend Ralph Newcomb floated Glen Canyon in June 
1959 (Martin, 1989). Deep in Glen Canyon, and years before he became the central voice 
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that connected dedicated droves of action-minded environmentalists, Abbey’s negative 
interpretation of large dams and their consequences was being sculpted and reinforced. 
Eight years later, Edward Abbey returned to Glen Canyon as a National Park Service 
Ranger, an experience that only reinforced his now passionate views; views that surfaced 
in his novel Desert Solitaire soon thereafter. Desert Solitaire oozed with Abbey’s 
contempt for canyon-inundating structures such as the Glen Canyon Dam, and reads with 
an air of certainty that Lake Powell is only temporary. Abbey, the inspiration for a new 
environmental movement, wrote that it is only a matter of time before, “some unknown 
hero with a rucksack full of dynamite strapped to his back will descend into the bowels of 
the dam…[and] ignite the loveliest explosion ever seen by man, reducing the great dam 
to a heap of rubble in the path of the river” (Abbey, 1968). This half-serious notion 
sparked hope into the readers of Desert Solitaire, bringing into the realm of possibility 
that a ten million ton dam could actually be removed and a few dozen years of floods and 
natural processes could return the wondrous Glen Canyon of before.  
As Abbey fantasized about Glen Canyon Dam in eventual ruin, (the resulting 
concrete and rubble-strewn rapid being called Reclamation Commissioner Floyd Dominy 
Falls), he made no further mention of such a terrorist act in Desert Solitaire (Martin, 
1989). Nonetheless, Abbey’s growing numbers of followers were bitten by the infectious 
notion that Glen Canyon Dam had to go. Again, in 1971, Abbey’s written words 
condemned the same plug in the Colorado River, as he insisted in the Sierra Club book 
Slickrock that, “Glen Canyon Dam already was sorely obsolete, such a technological 
dinosaur that surely the thing to do was to open the diversion tunnels and drain the 
reservoir” (Martin, 1989). This less destructive and fanatical approach to realizing a 
 15 
future pristine and natural Glen Canyon is the basis of the modern call to drain Lake 
Powell. Four years later, Abbey’s The Monkey Wrench Gang was released, and by this 
time in 1975 the ball had begun to roll toward a public opinion that is in opposition to 
massive dams, and the Glen Canyon Dam was soon to become the centerpiece for such a 
discussion.  
 
Draining Lake Powell 
 
 The initial resistance, mustered by Brower and the emerging environmental 
movement, against the Glen Canyon Dam was based mainly in the loss of the serene Glen 
Canyon. Nobody, however, bothered to imagine the far-reaching consequences that 
operating such a dam might have, especially on downstream habitat. This ignored 
foresight is clear in the explicit language of the Act that created the Glen Canyon Dam. 
The Colorado River Storage Project Act declared that the dam “was to be managed for 
regulating the flow of the Colorado River, storing water for beneficial consumptive use, 
making it possible for the States of the Upper Basin to utilize . . . the apportionments 
made to and among them in the Colorado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River 
Basin Compact, respectively, providing for the reclamation of arid and semiarid land, 
[and] for the control of floods” (Miller, 2000). Additionally, the Secretary of the Interior 
is instructed to operate the dam “in such a way as to produce the greatest practicable 
amount of power and energy that can be sold at firm power and energy rates” (Miller, 
2000). This language that dictates the justifications and operations of Glen Canyon Dam 
blatantly overlooks the potential costs of the same structure. As no environmental impact 
studies were mandated or conducted at the time of the authorization for Glen Canyon 
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Dam, no thought was given to possible impacts of the dam on downstream ecosystems, 
interested nations or parties, or the Glen Canyon itself.  
 In 1968 the ignorance related to adverse affects of dams on rivers began to be 
reversed. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 finally supported the prevention of 
further dam construction in America on certain rivers by declaring that “outstandingly 
remarkable [rivers] shall be preserved in free-flowing condition, and that they and their 
immediate environments shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of present and 
future generations” (U.S.C. §§ 4331-32). Furthermore, in 1970, the National 
Environmental Policy Act mandated a comprehensive study of the consequences that any 
future federal project would incur. Just over a decade after construction on Glen Canyon 
Dam had begun, concerns for the environment were beginning to replace the manifest-
destiny-driven mentality that had ruled the large “dam buildup” of the previous forty 
years. If an Environmental Impact Statement was to have been prepared in 1957, it is 
likely that construction on Glen Canyon Dam never would have commenced; however, 
speculations into the past is not the focus of this paper. 
 Instead, the above-mentioned congressional acts of the late 1960s, and early 
1970s, illustrate a transformation of public opinion that leads to the current debate. The 
income-generating component of Glen Canyon Dam, the power plant, demands rapid and 
immense fluctuations in water releases from Lake Powell in order to meet the daily 
demands of consumers. Although efficient for power generation, these daily fluctuations 
that were as large as 30,500 cfs (cubic feet per second) began to noticeably affect both 
ecosystems and recreation in the popular Grand Canyon downstream (Miller, 2000). In a 
response to a proposed increase in the dam’s power-generating capacity, the Department 
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of the Interior initiated the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies (GCES), a fifty million 
dollar examination “to address the concerns of the public and federal and state agencies 
about possible negative effects of the operations of Glen Canyon Dam on downstream 
environmental and recreational resources” (Glen Canyon Environmental Studies Final 
Report, 1988). A sluggish effort to complete the CGES on the part of the Bureau of 
Reclamation ten years later ultimately led to the Grand Canyon Protection Act (GCPA) 
of 1992. Aimed at mandating the completion of the original Environmental Impact 
Statement from the GCES, the GCPA also outlines the management of Glen Canyon 
Dam “in such manner as to protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the values 
for which Grand Canyon National Park and Glen Canyon National Recreational Area 
were established” (Miller, 2000). As another milestone that brought us one step closer to 
thoughts of draining Lake Powell, the GCPA marks the first time that pure cash flow and 
human-driven needs did not dictate the management of Colorado River water, but 
instead, a Bureau of Reclamation project was managed with environmental benefits as a 
primary concern.  
 In The Place No One Knew, a Sierra Club book published in 1963, Brower writes, 
"Glen Canyon died, and I was partly responsible for its needless death” (1963). It is 
common knowledge that David Brower felt personally responsible for letting Glen 
Canyon drown in a compromise for Echo Park, but until recently, only the surrendered 
aesthetic beauty and potential recreational enjoyment of the Glen Canyon were the 
reasons that Brower and the Sierra Club opposed the dam. The implications of the major 
acts that now protect rivers and specifically regulate the operations of Glen Canyon Dam 
reawakened Brower and others in opposition to Lake Powell on much broader grounds. 
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The now apparent and far-reaching adverse effects of the 186-mile long artificial lake in 
the desert spurred the creation of the Glen Canyon Institute by Richard Ingebretsen, a 
group that openly discussed draining Lake Powell and shared this vision with those such 
as David Brower.  
Powerless in comparison to the Sierra Club, the Glen Canyon Institute saw its 
primary goal propelled to the forefront of the national environmental debate on 
November 16, 1996. After scarcely a ten-minute speech by Brower, the Sierra Club 
Board of Directors voted unanimously to endorse the idea of decommissioning Glen 
Canyon Dam. Ingebretsen’s proposition that was now endorsed by Brower and the Sierra 
Club would leave the dam standing, but re-open the two diversion tunnels already there 
from the construction of the dam. With a combined ability to allow 200,000 cfs to bypass 
the dam, these re-commissioned diversion tunnels would certainly be able to handle the 
Colorado River’s highest natural flows (Miller, 2000). Even famed Reclamation head and 
dam advocate Floyd Dominy agrees that the lake can be drained, logistically speaking. 
Dominy claims that it would be necessary to cut new diversion tunnels all together rather 
than attempting to re-open the expertly sealed and reinforced diversions of 1957 (Miller, 
2000), but such details are not important here.  
Edward Abbey sparked the notion of “decommissioning” the Glen Canyon Dam 
by means of a single spectacular explosion, and others have proposed slower and less 
destructive methods of draining Lake Powell. It is, however, the 1996 Sierra Club 
endorsed plan that is being seriously considered in the arena of politics and public 
opinion, and therefore that this paper will focus on. Slight variations exist in the proposed 
execution of such a plan, as seen in the minor technical disagreements by Brower and 
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Dominy, but nevertheless, the point remains that draining Lake Powell is theoretically 
feasible, and all parties agree on this. The next step invites debate, as the benefits and 
costs of draining Lake Powell are analyzed.  
If one looks back to the momentum that Brower orchestrated against the dam in 
Dinosaur National Monument, then the growing support behind the Sierra Club’s motion 
to decommission Glen Canyon Dam will come as no surprise. Perhaps it is merely a sign 
of the changing times that Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior from 1993 until 2001, 
seems to heartily endorse the idea of removing dams. This is an odd outlook to adopt for 
the head of a department that includes the Bureau or Reclamation as it made a career out 
of constructing 133 Western water projects for 21.8 billion dollars (Miller, 2000). 
Nevertheless, Babbitt has “swung ceremonial sledgehammers to celebrate...the 
destruction of environmentally-harmful dams” and aspires, “to be the first secretary to 
tear down a big dam” (Babbitt, 1998).  
Currently, the 108-foot tall Elwha Dam and 210-foot tall Glines Canyon Dam 
(both on the Elwha River in Washington) are scheduled to be dismantled beginning in 
September of 2011 (NPS.gov). The Condit Dam, standing 125-feet tall in the path of the 
White Salmon River (also in Washington), will be torn down this fall as well (American 
Rivers). These three river restoration projects mark the absolute beginning of “large” dam 
removals. Since 1999, 145 dams have been removed in the United States, yet none have 
come close in size to the ones about to be removed (NPS.gov). The increasing size of 
dams in America that are being decommissioned lends promise to those fighting to 
restore Glen Canyon. Although Glen Canyon Dam is 500-feet taller than the Glines 
Canyon Dam, the simple fact that some larger dams are seen as no longer necessary and 
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are being removed is comforting to those who would like to see Lake Powell drained.  
Support for the Sierra Club’s proposal to decommission Glen Canyon Dam 
stretches even beyond a former cabinet member’s enthusiasm, and in 1997 a 
Congressional hearing was held to discuss the notion of draining Lake Powell or reducing 
its water storage capacity. Opponents of the idea hoped to squander the “absurd” proposal 
immediately, but, “like the 1954 Echo Park hearings and the 1967 Grand Canyon 
hearings, the 1997 Lake Powell hearings turned out to be a strategic mistake for the dam's 
defenders” (Miller, 2000), and instead public interest in the revolutionary, and now 
credible scheme, began to grow. Along the most general of lines, opposition to draining 
Lake Powell includes the water and power industries, as well as the Navajo Nation and 
residents of Page, Arizona. 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs opposes draining Lake Powell in hopes of defending 
38,000 Native Americans in the Upper Basin who depend on Colorado River Storage 
Project water and power (Martin, 1989). Additionally, the Navajo Nation, the prominent 
tribe in the Glen Canyon region, aims to capitalize on 50,000 acre-feet of promised 
Colorado River water rights, a plan that would be complicated without the possibilities of 
diversions from Lake Powell (Miller, 2000). Otherwise, environmentalists and recreation 
advocates are found on both sides of the debate. 
 
Power Generation 
A steep river that can be trapped in a deep canyon offers an ideal combination to 
construct a magnificent hydroelectric dam. In addition to other recognized benefits such 
as flood control and water storage, the clean and reliable hydroelectric power from Glen 
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Canyon Dam was a major selling point of the dam and the Colorado River Storage 
Project as a whole. In fact, Brower himself used the lure of extra power-generating 
capacity to argue for a higher Glen Canyon Dam in the place of a dam at Echo Park 
(Martin, 1989). In the simplest terms, the higher that stored water can fall from, the more 
force it can turn a turbine with, and therefore the more clean energy it can generate. 
Again, it is clear why a tall and narrow dam that backs water into a canyon hundreds of 
feet deep is ideal for producing hydroelectric power. In the proposed case of draining 
Lake Powell, then, one of the few costs that can be relatively easily anticipated are those 
related to power.  
The Glen Canyon Dam produces approximately 5000 gigawatt hours of power 
each year, with a maximum generating capacity of 1,300 megawatts (Harpman, 1999). 
Without water in Lake Powell, this electricity, and the revenues it generates, simply 
would be lost. It is important to note that Glen Canyon Dam provides "peaking" or "load-
following" power. Because water can be let into, or shut out of, the penstocks and thus 
the turbines almost instantaneously, hydroelectric dams can easily meet an immediate 
demand for more electricity. This compares with thermal power plants, which provide 
“base loads,” but cannot respond as quickly or efficiently to “peak” electricity demands 
(Miller, 2000), as when the need for electricity for air-conditioning surges every summer 
morning in Phoenix. 
The Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 already began an unprecedented trend 
of scaling back hydroelectric output for the benefit of the environment and specifically 
the Grand Canyon immediately downstream. The completed Environmental Impact 
Statement within the GCPA limits the daily fluctuations in releases from Glen Canyon to 
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5,000 cfs in months of lowered Colorado River flows, and 8,000 cfs in months of high 
flows. In addition, and a most ludicrous notion to traditional hydroelectric dam operators, 
the GCPA urges occasional releases of up to 40,000 cfs in order to simulate natural 
floods that restore sandbars and sustain channels (Report to Congress: Operations of Glen 
Canyon Dam, 2001). These mandates directly stifle power production and cripple the 
“cash register” aspect of the dam, a preposterous idea to some. Without bold and rapid 
swings in the water being released from Glen Canyon Dam, the power plant’s load-
following ability is notably weakened, not to mention the instances during which natural 
floods are simulated and precious captured water is allowed to bypass the massive 
turbines without contributing the slightest amount of electricity or power revenue. Such 
concessions in the name of the downstream ecosystems have caused an estimated thirty 
million dollar decrease in annual power revenues (River Resource Management in the 
Grand Canyon, 1996). No foreseeable events will return the power plant and the Glen 
Canyon Dam to operations with high and fluctuating releases that only maximize power 
revenue; under the 1992 GCPA, Glen Canyon power generation must account for Grand 
Canyon tourism and issues of environmental degradation.  
As the power plant within Glen Canyon Dam already operates at a lower pace, 
relative to its capabilities, then the costs of draining the lake as a whole, a proposition that 
includes decommissioning the dam and the power plant, are thirty million dollars less. 
The loss of the remaining power generation as a result of the Sierra Club’s proposal 
would need to be replaced somehow, and would most likely mean the construction of a 
thermal power plant in the region. Currently, the Glen Canyon Dam only produces a 
fraction of the region’s electricity, about three percent, but the dam’s power finds its way 
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to consumers in Arizona, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. This 
consumer base makes up thirty percent of electricity users in the six-state region (Miller, 
2000). Without Glen Canyon power, these 1.7 million customers would have access to an 
existing surplus of power that the Colorado Plateau enjoys; however, the subsidized rates 
of Glen Canyon power would no longer exist and the price tag for these consumers would 
increase to market-driven levels (Miller, 2000). Not everyone in the region would suffer, 
though, as competing utilities with excess electricity would now have a place to sell this 
power, but at increasingly competitive values due to the decreased supply and new 
consumer pool. A slightly higher power bill for 1.7 million Southwest consumers may 
also mean a lower bill for the remaining seventy percent (Harpman, 1999). In most cases 
the lure of reduced energy expenditures is enough to capture the support of many among 
this majority; however, Lake Powell’s influence in the region goes far beyond power 
alone.  
An often-overlooked method of easing the effects of losing a power source is 
simple conservation on the part of consumers. The time in which electricity would be 
needed to replace that lost at Glen Canyon could be greatly extended through the use of 
conservation. Of course conservation can be performed on a continuum of levels, but the 
potential to save vast amounts of energy from waste nonetheless exists in rethinking 
current electricity use habits.  
Another adverse effect of decommissioning Glen Canyon Dam would be felt by a 
power producer of a different kind. The Navajo Generating Station is a 2,250 megawatt 
coal- fired power plant located just northeast of Page, Arizona. The plant was built in the 
early 1970s to provide electricity for the Central Arizona Project (CAP), which is a series 
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of canals, pumping plants, dams, and holding reservoirs that deliver Colorado River 
water from Lake Havasu to Central Arizona (NGS Water Intake Project, 2005). Aside 
from producing more electricity than the Glen Canyon Dam power plant and the Hoover 
Dam Power plant combined (Friends of Lake Powell), the $350 million Navajo 
Generating Station was constructed near Lake Powell to ensure it had a dependable 
supply of cooling water for its three generators. In an agreement that was crucial to the 
construction of the plant in the first place, the Navajo Generating Station has received its 
annual quota of 34,100 acre-feet via intakes that pump water directly from the lake (NGS 
Water Intake Project, 2005). These intake pipes gulp precious water from an elevation of 
3,470 feet above sea level, or 230 feet below the lake’s full pool level of 3,700 feet. The 
prevalent dry years since the dam’s construction have already threatened the Navajo 
Generating Station’s supply of cooling water, as the surface of Lake Powell in recent 
years was only 70 feet higher than the minimum level necessary for the NGS water intake 
pumps to remain operational. However, a complete draining of the lake would render the 
existing intake pumps utterly useless, for they would be exposed on a cliff nearly 500 feet 
above the Colorado River below (NGS Water Intake Project, 2005). The costs to remedy 
this situation would certainly be less than abandoning the power plant as a whole, but 
electricity demands would be enormous in order to pump the vital cooling water 700 
vertical feet from the riverbed (Miller, 2000).  
 The proposal to decommission Glen Canyon Dam has numerous far-reaching 
consequences and benefits; yet, the anticipated effects on the region’s power generation 
are the most easily forecasted as little speculation exists surrounding the precise 
numerical data that is readily available. In this case, the direct monetary losses related to 
draining Lake Powell would be in the cost of eventually building and operating a power 
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plant to supplement for the lost hydropower production at Glen Canyon Dam. Currently, 
a thermal power plant would likely be constructed to ensure a capacity for growth in the 
Southwest, but it is important to note that the costs of operating a thermal power plant are 
significantly higher than the hydropower operating costs for Glen Canyon Dam (Miller, 
2000). This includes both external and internal costs, as producing hydropower is close to 
free after a dam is constructed, and air pollution will result if a thermal power plant is to 
replace the emission-free hydropower of Glen Canyon Dam. In the case of Navajo 
Generating Station, studies estimate assume air pollution equivalent to 3.5 million 
automobiles (Lake Powell Water Database). Add these costs to a more complicated and 
expensive water delivery system for Navajo Generating Station and the drawbacks of 
draining Lake Powell appear to drastically outweigh the benefits as far as electricity is 
concerned. Replacing Glen Canyon Dam electricity would certainly invite air pollution 
and raise energy expenditures for some, while the revenue stream for ecosystem 
protection and endangered species recovery in the Grand Canyon would cease. It was, 
after all, revenues from Glen Canyon Dam hydropower that financed the $50 million 
Glen Canyon Environmental Studies that culminated in the dam’s monitored daily 
operations and occasional simulated floods (Miller, 2000).  
In defense of draining Lake Powell, however, the additional water that would be 
stored in downstream Lake Mead as a result, would no longer become “wasted” to 
seepage and evaporation as it sat in the confines of Glen Canyon, but would instead 
generate an extra $35 million per year as it passed through the turbines within Hoover 
Dam (Miller, 2000). Yet, this concession may be too little, and in the arena of power 
generation, the scales seem tipped against the proposal to drain Lake Powell. Although a 
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clean energy source would be lost without Glen Canyon Dam backing up the Colorado 
River, the dynamic nature of this debate becomes evident as other factors are introduced. 
Sedimentation is a concern that plays into the calculations and predictions in all aspects 
of Lake Powell; it is the sand in the hourglass that is steadily running out of time. In the 
case of electricity, sediment accumulation will eventually reach the penstocks that are 
465 feet above the submerged riverbed on the upstream side of the dam, and power 
production will no longer be possible (Harpman, 1999). Estimates as to when this may 
occur are tricky, but in a few hundred years, hydropower production from Glen Canyon 
Dam will be obsolete and the dam itself will become obsolete in double that time—an 
engineered waterfall at the tail of a vast mudflat, all due to the steady buildup of sediment 
from the muddy Colorado. 
 
Sedimentation 
 
 If proponents to drain Lake Powell emanate a sense of urgency, then it is the 
unyielding deposition of sediment onto the floor of Lake Powell that is driving their 
haste. The Colorado River is neither the largest nor the longest river in the country, but it 
is renowned for the amount of suspended earth that it once transported from the 
Continental Divide to the Sea of Cortez. Prior to the enthusiastic development of the 
Colorado, 160 million tons of silt was discharged through the Grand Canyon every year, 
or 11 tons of silt for every acre-foot of water (Martin, 1989). It is not surprising, then, 
that a reservoir on a river containing 17 times more silt than the Muddy Mississippi is 
prone to filling in rather quickly. Historically, the mighty Colorado flushed 50-500 
million tons of silt out of the watershed every year, but today its reservoirs, and certainly 
Lake Powell, are shrinking constantly (River and Dam Management, 1987). 
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 In the struggle over draining Lake Powell, the looming reality of what will 
inevitably happen in the future offers a solid argument benefiting those who align with 
the Sierra Club on this issue. “Too thick to drink, too thin to plow” (Glen Canyon 
Institute CEA, 2000) is an old adage that captures the murky nature of Colorado River 
water; however, the Glen Canyon Dam now traps 85 percent of the sediments that 
previously rushed through the Grand Canyon, releasing clear and cold, sediment-starved 
water instead (Myers, 1998). Also, the springtime floods that once transported sediment, 
built beaches, and restored critical habitat for endangered species no longer enter the 
Grand Canyon (River and Dam Management, 1987). As a result, the character of the river 
downstream of the dam has been severely altered while the life expectancy of Lake 
Powell itself continues to diminish.  
The awe-inspiring canyons that confine the Colorado River to its serpentine 
course throughout the Southwest are the direct result of a steep river that transported an 
incredible amount of rough sediment to scour cliffs and dunes. In the Grand Canyon, just 
as in any other stretch of the Colorado, this flowing earth settled in places to provide a 
base for riparian vegetation and a home for canyon-dwelling creatures. In the more 
mellow Glen Canyon, such sediment-driven habitat on the banks of the river was much 
more prevalent as excited flows to wash these beaches away were less common (Myers, 
1998). The Grand Canyon, as seen today however, is much different without the constant 
influx and removal of silt. Sandbars and beaches used by both wildlife and adventure-
seekers are no longer replenished by the river’s sediment load. Native fish suffer in the 
now clear river, and scientists fear the outcome of a continued sediment-free Grand 
Canyon as well.  
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Moving our focus upstream and into Lake Powell itself, the sediment problem lies 
in its excess, rather than its absence. Needless to say, the 710 foot tall Glen Canyon Dam 
prevents any sediment from continuing downstream. Not only are the penstocks that 
release most of the lake’s water downstream located 465 feet above the dam’s base 
(Miller, 2000), but ground-level release works would still contain minimal levels of 
sediment as the narrow 186 mile long reservoir allows plenty of time for particles to 
settle to the lake’s bottom before they reach the dam. Still, estimates maintain that the 
canyons of Lake Powell will completely fill with sediments in 200-800 years (Myers, 
1998), varying with future sediment flows. A figure such as this is very difficult to 
accurately predict, as sediment accumulation is a phenomenon that takes place hundreds 
of feet under water and at different rates in every location, but the most reasonable 
predictions envision Lake Powell as nothing more than a vast mudflat behind an arching 
710 foot waterfall in as few as 300 years (Miller, 2000). Ten years ago, the storage 
capacity of Lake Powell had already been reduced by 932,000 acre-feet due solely to 
sedimentation (Myers, 1998), and at a rate of at least fifty thousand more acre-feet per 
year accumulating (Miller, 2000), the relatively short remaining lifespan of Glen Canyon 
Dam is no surprise.  
Ignoring the final fate of Lake Powell, sedimentation is still eating away at the 
National Recreation Area’s benefits, just as it eating away at the dam’s productive future. 
In the cases of recreation and storage, the steady increase of silt year after year into the 
reservoir will translate to diminishing benefits. Other positive aspects of the dam, such as 
power, will also feel the impact of sedimentation one day in the future instead of slowly 
along a line of diminishing returns. 
 29 
 Every day in which Glen Canyon Dam stands and operates as is, the longer that it 
will take to restore Glen Canyon if the reservoir is drained. As Scott Miller writes it in the 
Stanford Environmental Law Journal, “the accumulated sediments themselves and their 
adverse effects on the downstream environment will be much more difficult to deal with 
in 150 years than they would be in fifteen” (2000). This is to say that, while the costs to 
recreation, storage, and eventually power are all increasing constantly as the lake 
remains, the costs of draining the lake are also on the rise as time drags on. Therefore, the 
issue of sedimentation is a driving force behind decommissioning the dam. For instance, 
the Upper Basin states currently use significantly less water than the annual 7.5 million 
acre-feet allotted to them in the 1922 compact; however, by the time the Upper Basin has 
developed enough to claim this entire allotment, and the enormous storage capacity of 
Lake Powell is effectively put to use, tangible benefits of the lake may well be 
nonexistent due to the accumulation of sediment within the storage sink.  
 Advocates of the dam draw attention to the unsightly, rancid, and possibly toxic 
expanse of mud and silt that would be left behind if Lake Powell were to be drained 
(Friends of Lake Powell). At the same time, the fate of downstream Lake Mead is drawn 
into question, as it would then have to trap and contain all of the sediment that was 
previously impeded by Glen Canyon Dam. Lake Mead, being the Lower Basin's main 
source of storage would experience an exponential increase in sediment inflows and the 
problem now discussed regarding Lake Powell will become that of Lake Mead as the 
storage capacity behind Hoover Dam is rapidly reduced along with the reservoir’s 
lifespan (Miller, 2000).  
In response to critics who worry about the leftover tons of silt and mud, if the lake 
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were to be drained, studies prepared for the Glen Canyon Institute demonstrate that 
accumulated sediments would be washed out of the National Recreation Area in 2-6 
years under natural flow estimates (Glen Canyon Institute CEA, 2000). Recently exposed 
side canyons as a result of low lake levels provide a viewing window in support of these 
low predictions. Such side canyons along Lake Powell have flushed out the exposed silt 
in mere months and Dave Wegner of the Glen Canyon Institute contends that in addition 
to the rapid disappearance of silt left in the canyon, the unsightly white “bathtub ring” 
will also soon vanish. The bathtub ring marks where the sandstone has been submerged 
and the long accumulated and characteristic orange “desert rust” on the rock has been 
bleached and whitened. Such a ring already exists around the lake, and marks the scarcely 
seen full pool level of the water, yet Wegner’s optimistic claim of a rapid disappearance 
of this ring, in five to ten years, is based on the fact that an impressive natural reservoir 
existed in Lake Canyon (a side canyon of Glen Canyon) for years until 1915, and no 
records of complaints exist that the canyon remained a white-washed mud pit when it was 
later explored (Miller, 2000). Apparently, the temperamental natural flows within Glen 
Canyon, combined with the unforgiving desert conditions, are capable of rapidly 
restoring the inundated gorge to its pre-dam and natural state. That is if the historical case 
study at Lake Canyon or the recent exposure of Lake Powell side canyons are reliable 
indications.  
Sedimentation is certainly the issue that percolates into every debate over draining 
Lake Powell. This is no surprise, as it is the constant deposition of this sediment within 
the Glen Canyon that largely drives the life span of such a project. Yes, an eyesore of 
possibly toxic silt would be left in Glen Canyon after the waters of Lake Powell escaped 
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downstream to complete their natural course; however, sources reveal that such a load of 
mud can be swept away by the Colorado’s legendary capacity to carry sediment, and that 
this would take place much more quickly than many anticipate. In addition, the time scale 
on which the aesthetic pleasures of Glen Canyon return to pre-dam conditions is vastly 
different than the timescale of benefits enjoyed by downstream ecosystems. The Grand 
Canyon, in particular, would again experience large sediment loads that would replenish 
beaches and riparian habitats. Although a new dynamic between the Grand Canyon’s 
clear waters and young riparian zones has emerged in the absence of seasonal floods and 
silt, a thought surely must be given to the natural state of things, and such a natural state 
does not exist in the Grand Canyon today, as much as it may have the appearance of pure 
wilderness. 
Few figures that surround the proposal to drain Lake Powell are concrete and 
unanimously agreed upon, and the same can be said for the remaining lifespan of Lake 
Powell before it fully silts in. Yet, it is a fact that the lake will eventually fill in and 
before that time sediment will undoubtedly reach the penstocks and affect electrical 
production. These two uncontested truisms surface in every opinion on the matter and 
will weigh in heavily on the final decision. From a logical point of view, though, the 
constant diminishing returns and inevitable nature of sedimentation lends enormous 
support to those in favor of draining Lake Powell. Another monumental issue in this 
debate however, has its roots in the reason for the construction of the Glen Canyon Dam 
in the first place. If Lake Powell were to be drained, the effects on water supply, storage, 
and distribution must be clear, as such matters are political hotbeds in today’s arid West. 
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Water Supply and Distribution 
 
Hydrologic Indicators 
 
 The Colorado River, with its elaborate system of diversion and storage works, is 
currently delivering water to over 24 million people (Status of Federal Western Water 
Resources, 2001), irrigating 2 million acres of land, generating 4,000 megawatts of 
hydroelectric power (USBR Annual Operating plan, 2009), and all from a mere 14 inches 
of average annual precipitation within the boundaries of the basin (Howe, 1990). No river 
has been asked to do so much with so little water as has the Colorado, resulting in current 
water demands that are not much less than mean inflows (Status of Federal Western 
Water Resources, 2001), and likely setting the stage for future water wars. As greenhouse 
gas emissions continue to rise, fostering a global warming effect, changes in the climate 
will adversely disrupt Western water resources. Different amounts of precipitation, as 
well as the intensity, timing and form of that precipitation will pose significant challenges 
to existing Colorado River water resource infrastructure and distribution.  
In addition, changes in snowmelt timing and rates of evapotranspiration will 
culminate under a booming population in the West to foster water scarcity and resulting 
conflict. The proposal to drain Lake Powell and the ensuing debate illustrates many water 
supply concerns that have permeated the thoughts of Westerners. The issues related to 
water supply, delivery, and losses associated with Lake Powell clearly garner much 
attention in relation to the proposed decommissioning of Glen Canyon Dam. Major fears 
evoked from the thought of keeping Lake Powell include the loss of water to bank 
storage, and the ever-increasing rate of evaporation, as well as projected future droughts 
that would limit the practical use of the reservoir. Simulations suggest minimal hardships 
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felt by Lake Powell water users in the event that the dam was decommissioned. Those 
relying directly on water from the lake, on the other hand, and certain Native American 
tribes involved would feel direct, and in some cases detrimental effects of a restored Glen 
Canyon. In addition, proponents of Lake Powell point to a greatly decreased basin-wide 
storage capacity, and uncertain regulation of flows in the Upper Basin, as reasons to 
ignore the proposal of the Sierra Club and keep Glen Canyon Dam operating as is.  
Clearly, water ends up serving far too many purposes to count or specifically 
categorize, but according to the United States Bureau of Reclamation, the water of a river 
basin, and specifically the CRB, can fall into the following beneficial consumptive use 
categories: irrigation, municipal and industrial purposes, electric power generation, 
mineral activities, fish and wildlife, livestock, and recreation; all the while keeping in 
mind associated losses that are incurred within the infrastructure that makes them 
possible (USBR Annual Operating Plan, 2009). By far the largest portion of water in both 
the Upper and Lower CRB goes towards agriculture, an activity that sucks up 63 percent 
of the Upper Basin consumptive use (USBR Report, 2009); while it is still estimated that 
over a third of the irrigated lands in the same Upper Basin states receive less than a full 
supply of water, either due to lack of distribution facilities or junior water rights (USGS 
Comparisons of Average Consumptive Use, 2002). These figures are averages of the 
consumptive uses and losses from the year 1971 through 1995, and seem to accurately 
represent CRB water allocation and distribution in the Upper Basin in years since all of 
the major storage and transport facilities have been in place. 
The Colorado River Storage Project is responsible for most of the storage and 
transport facilities that are found in the Upper Basin, Lake Powell being the key storage 
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unit. The impetus for the Colorado River Storage Project came following the completion 
of Hoover Dam and the Lake Mead Reservoir. The compact of 1922 “had given Upper 
Basin states some security, but when California’s boom resumed after World War II and 
the city of Phoenix quadrupled in size as well, the Upper Basin states expressed 
understandable concern that folks in California and Arizona were getting into the habit of 
using water that was supposed to eventually go to them” (Ward, 2004). Therefore, 
storage facilities were demanded above the Lee’s Ferry divide, and the 26.2 million acre-
feet of Colorado River water that is held in Lake Powell was to serve as a huge savings 
bank of water that allows development in the Upper Basin states of Wyoming, Colorado, 
New Mexico, and Utah, and can be drawn upon during dry years to make Colorado River 
Compact deliveries (Operations of Glen Canyon Dam Report to Congress, 2001).  
Although very little Lake Powell water is actually used in the Upper Basin, (no 
outlet works exist in the lake aside from a diversion to the Navajo Generating Station and 
another into Page, AZ) the mere presence of a major storage facility within Upper Basin 
boundaries provides security to those states in the form of regulated flows into the thirsty 
Lower Basin. Because the 1922 compact generally requires the Upper Basin to deliver 
seventy-five million acre-feet every ten years, the Upper Basin must assume most ill 
effects of a drought. However, it appears that the Upper Basin would lose little water 
throughout the projected future in such a scenario. Currently, the Upper Basin uses only 
about four million acre-feet of water, or just over one-half of its compact allocation 
(Miller, 2000). The absence of Lake Powell would most likely affect water use in the 
Upper Basin only if its water consumption increases drastically. Clearly, the nature of 
future development and water needs is tricky to estimate and open to much speculation, 
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but the employment of sophisticated models can help to shed light upon future 
circumstances, and many such projections exist.  
Streamflow indicators and watershed statistics can be used to understand the 
hydrologic trends of the Colorado River and its tributaries. Records from 1906 to 2000 
reveal that the mean annual streamflow over the past century has been 15.1 million acre-
feet (MAF) (Christensen, 2006). To look even further into history, tree ring 
reconstructions, dating to the year 1524, suggest that the long-term average flow may be 
closer to 13.5 MAF per year (Barnett). These recently understood hydrologic patterns 
pose a problem for the future of CRB water resources because the inflated historical 
streamflow from 1906-1990 of 16.6 MAF annually is nearly completely allocated for 
consumptive use in the Colorado River Compact of 1922 that based its figures on 
irregularly wet years and used primitive measuring tools to appropriate 16.5 MAF (7.5 
MAF to each the Upper and Lower Basin and 1.5 MAF to Mexico after the 1944 Treaty) 
annually, before accounting for reservoir evaporation (Nash, 1991). The system has only 
been able to operate reliably in the past due to the Upper Basin currently not utilizing its 
full entitlement, but instead sufficing on 4.2 MAF of water per year (Status of Federal 
Western Water Resources, 2001). As drought conditions in the Colorado River Basin 
appear to be more frequent occurrences, the 60 MAF of total reservoir storage capacity 
(USBR Annual Operating Plan, 2009) in the basin seems increasingly difficult to reach, 
let alone sustain.  
Lake Mead and Lake Powell, both on the main stem of the Colorado River, are by 
far the largest reservoirs in the system, with a combined storage capacity of 51.9 MAF, 
accounting for 86 percent of the basin’s total storage (USBR Annual Operating Plan, 
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2009). On one hand, such massive bodies of water can sustain year-round water 
deliveries and control peak discharge events, but on the other, a large reservoir surface 
area in a desert climate that is predicted to experience even warmer temperatures allows 
for huge amounts of evaporation and therefore unnecessary losses to an already strained 
watershed; one that is sure to be further taxed in the future.  
Most of the reservoirs in the Colorado River Basin are in the Upper Basin, and 
Lake Powell provides nearly three-quarters of this Basin’s active storage (Miller, 2000). 
Yet, users of Upper CRB water tend to lose about 13 percent of their total annual 
allocation to reservoir evaporation, an average of 1.7 million acre-feet (MAF). The 
results from several models agree that the Southwestern U.S. is likely to experience 
precipitation and evapotranspirtation changes that result in less runoff and water 
availability (Brekke, 2009). As a consequence, the existing water infrastructure may not 
be able to cope with different patterns of streamflow and still serve their intended 
purposes.  
The fragile equilibrium of such a heavily relied upon river is clearly an important 
area of study to many, prompting numerous models and simulations that have attempted 
to predict future streamflows and other changes due to a shifting climate. The most 
advanced, and therefore presumed to be the most accurate, climate change studies are 
done by combining downscaled and bias corrected simulated hydraulic and water 
resource scenarios and models to circumstances driven by observed historical climates 
that are also projected into the future using simulations to serve as a control model 
(Christensen, 2004). A general “business-as-usual” scenario is almost always compared 
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to a control scenario in order to demonstrate what is likely to happen, in terms of climate 
change, if we continue to emit carbon dioxide at current levels.  
Under “business-as-usual” projections, average annual temperatures in the CRB 
could increase as much as 2.4 degrees Celsius, and, in turn, initiate many other changes 
(Water in the West, 1998). Average annual precipitation is likely to decrease by up to 6 
percent and annual runoff by 17 percent (Christensen, 2006). Most models show 
reductions in summer precipitation and increases in winter precipitation; however, April 
1st snow water equivalent in the CRB is unanimously depicted as declining and by as 
much as 38 percent (Christensen, 2006). Although such values may be difficult to 
interpret across the watershed as a whole, all of the above hydrologic changes are 
reflected, and most easily seen, in reservoir system performance (Christensen 2004). 
Average total basin reservoir storage always steadily declined in studies; by up to 40 
percent over the next 90 years, compared with just 7 percent if carbon dioxide emissions 
levels were to repeat the trend of the last 90 years (Christensen 2006). 
Losses to evaporation and bank storage compound the marginal and diminishing 
storage capacity of Lake Powell. Although it is difficult to estimate the amount of loss 
due to evaporation in Lake Powell alone, the values range from about 550,000 to 
1,000,000 acre-feet per year, while the lake is at full pool level, asserting that even using 
the lower estimate, enough water would evaporate in a single Labor Day weekend to be 
able to satisfy the water needs of 17,000 Western homes for an entire year. Presently, 
evaporation is the second largest consumptive use of Colorado River water in the entire 
basin, a staggering amount that ranks only behind irrigated agriculture (Miller, 2000).  
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In addition to evaporation, water is lost to what is called bank storage, or seepage 
into the porous Navajo sandstone of Glen Canyon. It is estimated that between 1964 and 
1976, as the reservoir filled behind Glen Canyon Dam, 600,000 acre-feet per year was 
lost to the magnificent orange cliffs, and since reaching capacity, another 350,000 acre 
feet of Lake Powell water is subsequently absorbed each year (Hansen of Nat'l Parks and 
Public Lands, 1998). As Lake Powell fills with sediment and the storage capacity 
decreases, the amount of evaporation will also decrease but at a much slower rate (Miller, 
2000). This will happen because the lake is filling in from the bottom up and the surface 
area of the lake will therefore remain larger in relation to the diminishing total capacity of 
the canyon to hold water. As a result, the value of Lake Powell as a storage facility, 
which can be argued was marginal to begin with, will decrease because of the relative 
increase in evaporation. 
 It does need to be mentioned, however, that not all of the losses reported above 
would actually leave the CRB indefinitely, an area of calculation where the disputed 
figures can be somewhat explained. First, although accounting for a very small amount, 
some of the water that evaporates is in fact returned to the system in the form of 
precipitation that falls on the western side of the continental divide. The rest tends to be 
blown out of the basin entirely and up to the Midwest where it falls as rain (Miller, 2000). 
Also, if the contents of Glen Canyon were to be drained and largely assumed within Lake 
Mead, as proposed, the evaporation out of Lake Mead would logically have to increase as 
well. Experts contend that this new evaporation behind Hoover Dam could be as much as 
a nine percent, or 70,000 acre-feet, increase due to the greater surface area of Lake Mead 
(USBR). Finally, one must be careful when reading values for losses to evaporation, as 
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how each number is arrived at varies slightly. It is usually the case that values predicting 
lower amounts of evaporation, have already subtracted the assumed evaporation from the 
Glen Canyon if the lake had never inundated it, thus calculating just the additional losses 
that are a result of the man-made reservoir. While other, larger estimates, generally 
demonstrate simply the total losses from Lake Powell to evaporation as occur today. It is 
even safe to assume that if exposed, much of the water lost to within the Navajo 
Sandstone of Glen Canyon would also eventually be released back into the system 
through seeps and springs over many years.  
In total, then, draining Lake Powell would likely eliminate the loss of 
approximately one million acre-feet of water each year (Miller, 2000), a number that can 
be more easily be agreed upon. Most experts will demonstrate confidence in this final 
number, as it is much more simple to measure the inflows into Lake Powell and compare 
them to the regulated outflows from Glen Canyon Dam and combined with the level of 
the lake’s water, a relatively accurate number can be derived that explains the total losses 
from Lake Powell. The amounts of this one million acre-feet per year, however, that can 
be attributed to evaporation or bank storage are values much more squabbled over. 
Another set of projections is the array of computer simulations and models that attempt to 
reveal future conditions and water resource scenarios, both with and without Lake 
Powell.   
 As 70 percent of the Colorado’s flow originates as snowmelt, and a staggering 85 
percent of streamflow comes from just 15 percent of the basin’s area, namely the high 
country of the Upper Basin, slight temperature changes are greatly amplified when 
viewed through differences in Colorado River flow (Nash, 1991). Furthermore, despite 
 40 
the fact that only eight percent of the river’s water originates below Lees Ferry, AZ, the 
CRB is incredibly susceptible to increased evapotranspiration in a warmer climate 
(Barnett). Generally speaking, increases in temperature within the CRB, and especially 
the Upper Basin, will increase the rain to snow ratio, shift runoff times, increase 
evaporation, and decrease streamflow. 
 One model concludes that reduced reservoir storage due to a drier future climate 
on average in the West, would greatly affect releases from the Upper Basin to the Lower 
Basin, potentially sparking conflict. Releases from Glen Canyon Dam to the Lower Basin 
(as mandated by the Colorado River Compact of 1922) will only be met 59-75 percent of 
years according to such research (Callaway, 1996). These results show that a relatively 
modest change in streamflow will result in much larger changes in reservoir storage, a 
dangerous trend considering that a mere five percent drop in annual runoff is all that is 
needed for the first Colorado River Compact violations to occur (Christensen, 2006). This 
model gives no thought to the prospect of draining the lake, but does reveal problems in 
water deliveries that may be encountered if the current infrastructure, including Glen 
Canyon Dam, were to be maintained.  
Another simulation, on the other hand, demonstrates the effects of draining Lake 
Powell on water administration, and found that in average years, “decommissioning Glen 
Canyon Dam would have no impact on water deliveries in the Upper Basin, would 
decrease the delivery of water to the Lower Basin by one percent (but only cutting into 
their use of "surpluses," not their Compact allocation), and would increase the total 
availability of water by approximately 500,000 acre-feet per year” (Miller, 2000). The 
confidence in simulations such as the ones discussed above thoroughly discredits the 
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argument of those who would like to keep Lake Powell, yet, in the realm of Western 
water, politics often trumps actual hydrologic indicators. 
Political Concerns 
 The current rate of evaporation from Lake Powell, the loss to bank storage, and 
the promise of the proportion of these losses only to increase as time goes on, seems to 
make the effects of decommissioning Glen Canyon Dam on water availability 
inconsequential throughout the CRB. Politically, the concept of draining Lake Powell 
seems insurmountable, as the Glen Canyon Dam is the centerpiece of the Colorado River 
Storage Project and only major storage reservoir in the Upper Basin. Without the over 26 
MAF of storage behind Glen Canyon Dam, over forty percent of all the storage in the 
basin, or close to the equivalent of two years of the total flow of the Colorado River, 
would be allowed to flow largely unregulated past Lees Ferry and into the Lower Basin 
(Miller, 2000). Most importantly, this enormous amount of water now held in Lake 
Powell is a safety net within the CRB that extends wet cycles in the region well into dry 
periods to stifle the negative effects of a drought in both the Upper and Lower Basins. 
The Upper Basin, it is evident, stands to lose the most in the absence of Glen Canyon 
Dam, but these ill-effects will only be felt in the future when water development and 
consumption in the Upper Basin increases.  
Currently, projections indicate that Upper Basin consumptive water use will swell 
to merely five million acre-feet by the year 2030, only one million acre-feet more than 
what is presently used (Miller, 2000), and still 2.5 MAF shy of the Upper Basin’s full 
entitlement as allocated by the 1922 Compact. On top of this apparent under-dog status of 
the Upper Basin, Lake Powell, the prized storage pool upstream of Lees Ferry, provides 
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almost no water to consumptive uses in the Upper Basin, but rater regulates deliveries to 
the Lower Basin (Glen Canyon Institute’s CEA, 2000). This is to say that without Lake 
Powell, water deliveries to the Upper Basin would remain the same as current levels, 
while rare shortfalls in deliveries to the Lower Basin could be offset through conservation 
and better management.  
As Wayne Solley observes in Estimates of Water Use in the Western United 
States, “the era of building large dams to meet water demand in the United States is 
drawing to a close…the western United States is in transition from an era of water-supply 
development to an era of water-demand management and conservation” (1997), and 
recent statistics on consumption support such a claim. Despite a 35 percent increase in 
the population of the West since 1975, America as a whole consumes two percent less 
water than nearly 40 years ago (Miller, 2000). This is not to say that wasteful water 
practices are still not a problem. The heavily subsidized water of the Colorado River 
encourages inefficient irrigation practices, so much so that the Bureau of Reclamation 
believes the Imperial Irrigation District in Southern California to be wasting 200,000 
acre-feet every year (Rosekrans, 1997). The issue, however, remains that tailoring growth 
within the CRB to fit within the limited resources of the river is a much simpler and less 
problematic approach then harnessing the river to suit our growing needs. Just as in the 
case of power generation at Glen Canyon Dam, conservation of water by those who 
eventually put the resourse to use can greatly ameliorate stresses of water availability. 
Draining Lake Powell and eliminating the one million acre-feet of loss seems a step in 
the direction of water conservation and sustainable management.  
The Navajo Generating Station and the town of Page, AZ pump their water 
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directly from Lake Powell. Surely, the absence of Lake Powell would affect costs of 
water to each place, but with no other water source around, the Colorado River would 
still supply the remote power plant and town with the water they need. Page, a town of 
just over seven thousand residents would not simply vanish without the convenient water 
from Lake Powell—although decreased tourism would greatly reduce the prominence of 
Page. All told, political hurdles stand to block the Glen Canyon Dam from being 
decommissioned on the basis of water availability and deliveries, rather than the lessons 
from a cost-benefit analysis.  
Ways around these political deadlocks have been suggested, such as “changing 
the Upper Basin's delivery point from Lees Ferry to the foot of Hoover Dam—thereby 
effectively giving the Upper Basin use of the storage in Lake Mead for delivery 
purposes” (Miller, 2000); however, revising the Colorado River Compact is another 
discussion entirely. Evaporative losses and bank storage combined with constant 
sedimentation eliminates one million acre-feet every year from the lake, while the 
sluggish water development in the Upper Basin assures uncompromised water deliveries 
to the Lower Basin for some time in the absence of Lake Powell. Even emergency flood 
control aspects of Glen Canyon Dam could still be maintained without Lake Powell, if 
the dam were to be kept in place as is illustrated in the current proposal. The additional 
nine million acre-feet of storage that would still exist above Hoover Dam, however, 
would reduce the chances of an emergency flood scenario (Miller, 2000).  
 Opposition to the Sierra Club’s proposal in the arena of water supply, then, lies 
largely in political agendas. What must be considered though, in either case, is where the 
extra water, saved from a Glen Canyon Dam that no longer impedes the Colorado River, 
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would be used. Scot Miller in Undamming Glen Canyon: Lunacy, Rationality, or 
Prophecy? eloquently posses the question, “Would water saved from evaporation be used 
for satisfying Los Angeles' growing domestic needs, or would it be used to restore the 
Colorado River Delta? Would Glen Canyon be dedicated to wilderness, off-road vehicles, 
or curio shops?” (2000). Miller’s quandary captures the ambiguous character of the 
debate over decommissioning Glen Canyon Dam, but if political barriers could be 
overcome then draining Lake Powell certainly makes sense in terms of water supply and 
distribution. Adjusted recreation and tourism within Glen Canyon National Recreation 
Area and the Grand Canyon below will also occur were Lake Powell not to exist.  
 
Recreation 
 
 To many, the most recognizable aspect of the Glen Canyon Dam is the 
recreational possibilities that are a result. Most people only know that Lake Powell exists 
because of the boating and tourism offered there, while others downstream put little 
thought towards the impacts of Glen Canyon Dam on world-class trout fishing and 
exciting Grand Canyon rafting excursions. The dam’s impacts on these recreational 
values however, are enormous. Although the Colorado Basin Act lists “recreational 
needs” as the fourth priority for the operation of Glen Canyon Dam (Glen Canyon 
Institute’s CEA, 2000), it is a category in this discussion that carries large economic 
losses and gains, while it is also a major reason that any significant public attention is 
given to the dam and the lake in the first place.  
 In terms of direct financial benefits that can be attributed to Glen Canyon Dam, 
recreation trumps all other associated impacts. According to the National Park Service, 
tourists visiting Lake Powell contribute more than $400 million annually to the regional 
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economy, and another $21.3 million is generated by the dam-controlled Grand Canyon 
rafting below Lees Ferry (Miller, 2000). These are concrete and impressive numbers in a 
region that was largely inaccessible prior to the construction of Glen Canyon Dam. The 
peak occupation of Glen Canyon before construction of the dam was in 1889, when some 
1000 miners lived in the canyon. As the lake filled, however, Glen Canyon saw some 
44,000 people eager to take a last look (Miller, 2000). It took the impending demise of 
Glen Canyon, the actual construction of the dam at the tail of the calm and majestic 
canyon, to finally lure people into the carved chasms of the Southwest in search of a 
delight that few before them had experienced. Today, Lake Powell and Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area (GCNRA) attracts 2.5 million annual visitors, many finding 
enjoyment on the 250 square miles of flat-water that is Powell reservoir (Glen Canyon 
Institute’s CEA, 2000). Another 20,000 anglers visit Lees Ferry, 33,000 sightseers ride 
on motorboats from Glen Canyon Dam to Lees Ferry, and 15,000 to 20,000 whitewater 
rafters float through the Grand Canyon each year (Glen Canyon Institute’s CEA, 2000). 
In total, swimming, fishing, hiking, boating, water-sports, scuba diving, guided lake 
tours, scenic air flights, rafting trips down the Colorado River, and other tourist 
attractions within and below GCNRA generate steady revenue to the communities of the 
region and open an isolated niche of the country to many more people than would have 
explored it otherwise. Lake Powell trails in popularity only behind Yosemite National 
Park (Miller, 2000), and for these reasons, the proposal to drain Powell reservoir 
encounters yet another wave of dissent.  
Not all of these benefits would be lost upon the disappearance of Lake Powell. 
Certainly, surface recreation on the lake would vanish, as would the trout fishery below 
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the dam that currently provides $1.8 million to the region (Glen Canyon Institute’s CEA, 
2000). The city of Page, Arizona, on the banks of Lake Powell, would suffer from the 
loss of more than a million people a year who currently pass through on their way to the 
Lake (Martin, 1989), but rafting in the Grand Canyon would undoubtedly continue, and 
an untold number of curious visitors would venture into a restored Glen Canyon to raft, 
hike, and sightsee. If the current popularity of the Grand Canyon is any indication, then 
the economic value of gained recreation within Glen Canyon would be enormous; 
certainly tens of millions of dollars. In fact, draining Lake Powell and restoring Glen 
Canyon would most likely appeal to many more people than the area could accommodate 
(Miller, 2000).  
In 1919 the Grand Canyon became the nation’s 17th national park (NPS.gov). 
With a similar history as the Glen Canyon, the steep and turbid Grand Canyon saw few 
humans prior to the Glen Canyon Dam. Until 1959 and the start of the dam, a mere 500 
people had made the trip through the Grand Canyon. Beginning the very next year, as the 
fate of Glen Canyon became a certain and grim reality, 200 visitors per year began 
experiencing the river through the Grand Canyon, a number that jumped to 16,436 by the 
next decade (Miller, 2000). Now, over 70,000 people annually enjoy a form of recreation 
within the Grand Canyon, whether it is fishing, rafting, or hiking, and the popular canyon 
receives 190,000 visitor-days per year, an amount restricted only by the limited number 
of permits issued to rafters (NPS.gov). In fact, Miller points out that “the direct value of 
rafting the Grand Canyon alone surpasses the revenues from [Glen Canyon] hydropower” 
(Undamming Glen Canyon: Lunacy, Rationality, or Prophecy?, 2000), a figure that some 
with a vested interest in Grand Canyon-based businesses fear will decrease if natural 
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flows were to return through the Canyon, but other figures suggest otherwise.  
Rafting in the Grand Canyon will certainly continue regardless of the fate of Glen 
Canyon Dam, but unregulated flows through the “ditch,” as rafting enthusiasts call it, 
would alter the commercial structure of the Grand Canyon rafting industry. Uncertainty 
lies in how much this popular industry stands to change. Many predict a reduced length 
of the commercial season and increase the unpredictability of whitewater within the 
Grand Canyon. This would translate to much more dangerous trips in times of high water, 
and rapids that change erratically from year to year, both serving to increase the danger 
associated with rafting during a brief season. The rest of the year, on the other hand, 
would be characterized by variable flows through the canyon, sometimes nearly ceasing 
all together. The result would be a Grand Canyon Rafting industry with much shorter 
seasons and instances of increased peril and liability if Glen Canyon Dam were to be 
decommissioned. Shorter and more unpredictable rafting seasons according to these 
estimates would cut into the 21.3 million dollar revenues from rafting each year, but 
when analyzed beyond a financial stance, a heightened sense of danger in a more purely 
wilderness setting, one that is no longer regulated by a man at a switchboard, is an 
attraction to adventure-seeking river runners that cannot be economically categorized. 
The significance of a wilderness experience can constitute the major attraction of rafting 
to a one-time rafter and seasoned professional alike. In this debate, the unquantifiable joy 
from a purely wild and exciting river trip may well greatly support the proposal to return 
the Glen and Grand Canyons to a relatively free-flowing state. 
 In conflict with the views more commonly read about, an interview with Grand 
Canyon river guide Morgan Holpuch reveals the possibility of a little affected rafting 
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industry. As a former guide in Cataract Canyon, a largely free-flowing stretch of the 
Colorado that runs through Canyonlands National Park and meets Glen Canyon beneath 
the backwaters of Lake Powell, Holpuch has trouble seeing a drastic change in Grand 
Canyon recreation if Lake Powell were drained. Holpuch recalls that the unregulated 
Cataract Canyon commercial rafting season is in fact slightly longer than the current 
season in the Grand Canyon, even though Cataract Canyon, located far upstream on the 
main stem of the Colorado, is certain to have less water flowing through it. This is 
because significant tributaries, including the San Juan River, the Little Colorado River 
and many other smaller streams join the Colorado River between Cataract Canyon and 
the lower Grand Canyon, with the possibility of only adding volume to the river.  
Again, using the free-flowing nature of Cataract Canyon as a reference, Holpuch 
compares past low flow scenarios that he has successfully navigated through Cataract 
(near 1,500 cfs) with the lowest recorded flows through the Grand Canyon. Holpuch 
remains confident that Grand Canyon rafting will be minimally affected for most of the 
year, other than spring flooding instances, because the lowest flows through the Grand 
Canyon are still more than 500 cfs greater than those through Cataract, during which 
commercial rafting still resumed. Accordingly, Holpuch predicts the engine-toting Grand 
Canyon rafters to be the only river enthusiasts to be angered by the return of normal 
flows through the Grand Canyon, as the uniquely timid clientele on their trips may shy 
away from unpredictable river velocities. This may result in a shift toward more able and 
enthusiastic patrons within the Grand Canyon (characteristics that most guides 
appreciate), while warmer water temperatures in a post Lake Powell Grand Canyon may 
attract the extra business needed to offset that lost on motor-rigs. Either way, the 
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recreational aspects associated with draining Lake Powell are still secondary to ecology 
and aesthetics in the eyes of Grand Canyon river guide Holpuch.  
 Without Glen Canyon Dam, the clear and cold water that escapes Lake Powell 
and journeys downstream would be replaced by the naturally muddy and thermally 
variable waters of the past. Trout fisheries that have flourished in the cool, sediment-free 
water within and just below Lake Powell would suffer greatly upon the return of natural 
flows, likely eliminating the $1.8 million trout fishing industry at the base of the dam 
(Miller, 2000). Yet, some of these losses would be offset if native fish populations were 
restored. For instance, in the five years after 1963, twelve million trout and five million 
bass were dumped into Lake Powell, all species that require water temperatures and 
sediment loads very different from those in the naturally flowing Colorado River 
(Rogers, 2006). The populations of these fish and associated fishing industries would be 
negatively affected by draining Lake Powell, but a strong argument exists in the fact that 
these fish are invasive species that often out-compete the sensitive native species within 
the Colorado River, and therefore should not be in the water shed in the first place. These 
monetary losses would almost certainly be reduced as some of the displaced boaters and 
anglers resumed their watery outings on other Western reservoirs. An often overlooked 
cost of such popular tourist destinations as Lake Powell, however, is the accompanying 
pollution and ecological disturbances and these associated harms. 
A large portion of the activities enjoyed within GCNRA is limited to affluent 
visitors (Glen Canyon Institute’s CEA, 2000). Owning, renting, and using boats and 
watercraft is inherently expensive, one estimate assumes the value of boats alone on Lake 
Powell to be $191 million (Miller, 2000). Not only does this segregate those who 
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typically visit Lake Powell based on income, but the emissions from the 1.5 million 
boaters annually on Powell reservoir add up to a staggering amount of fuel being added 
to the lake (Miller, 2000). Although 58 percent of visitors participate in off-water, off-
beach activities, such as hiking, these activities are almost always accessed by boat or 
other means that require fuel combustion. All told, about one million gallons of 
hydrocarbon pollution is dispersed into Lake Powell each year. Two percent of this is, or 
20,000 gallons, is raw oil (Glen Canyon Institute’s CEA, 2000). This is the equivalent of 
an Exxon Valdez oil spill into Lake Powell roughly every 15 years. As the most heavily 
visited of all the areas in the interior West managed by the National Park Service (Martin, 
1989), Lake Powell is the recipient of enormous amounts of pollution, an issue that will 
always accompany popular recreation, but concerns many who imagine what the Glen 
Canyon may look like without the lake smothering it. The fear of toxic sediments that 
have accumulated on the bottom of Lake Powell becoming an eyesore and health hazard 
once exposed is a legitimate one, and the lake only continues to become more polluted 
due to heavy recreation.  
As the National Park Service reported in 1946, the recreational resources within 
the Colorado River Basin had a unique character that translated to a high recreational 
potential in its wild, unspoiled canyons (Martin, 1989). This prediction has come true, in 
part due to the creation of Lake Powell that spans four rural counties that are highly 
dependant on the related tourist dollars (Glen Canyon Institute’s CEA, 2000), but also 
simply due to the region’s distinctive wilderness characteristics. There is no doubt that 
lucrative recreation will continue in the Glen and Grand Canyons even without Lake 
Powell, and the diminished pollution that will no longer be deposited into the Colorado 
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River Basin through Lake Powell is just one convincing point for decommissioning the 
Glen Canyon Dam, among other positive aspects associated with recreation after a 
drained Lake Powell. A more speculative and encompassing characteristic of the Glen 
Canyon Dam, however, is the region’s ecology and how this relates to the presence of the 
reservoir. 
 
Ecology 
In the early 1980s, those familiar with the resources and the ecosystem below the 
Glen Canyon Dam, including Grand Canyon recreation enthusiasts and environmental 
advocates, began to voice concerns that ecological changes were taking place due to the 
dam’s presence and management. In response to a proposal to increase the generating 
capacity and peaking power of Glen Canyon’s powerplant, the $50 million Glen Canyon 
Environmental Studies were begun that ultimately led to the 1992 Grand Canyon 
Protection Act which recognizes and seeks to diminish downstream environmental 
impacts of the dam and its management. Grand Canyon rafters had begun to notice the 
disappearance of sandbars and beaches after the dam trapped the sediment that 
historically replenished such habitats and rafting necessities. Others too noticed the 
declining health and prevalence of native fish species within the now cold and clear 
Colorado River downstream of Lake Powell. The health of canyon ecosystems, whether it 
was raised for underlying recreational benefits or simply due to a newfound 
environmental concern, was, for the first time publicly popular. So much so, that 
legislation was passed specifically to address the negative impacts on the vegetation and 
wildlife in the Grand Canyon from the operations of Glen Canyon Dam above. Clearly 
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the environmental sentiment that was utterly absent during the construction of Glen 
Canyon Dam was beginning to take priority in the later part of the twentieth century. 
Today, the same concern that prompted the 1992 Glen Canyon Protection Act is 
much more widespread and legitimate. Although scarce data exists that allows 
researchers to comprehensively describe the character of the Glen Canyon river system 
before the closure of the Dam (River and Dam Management, 1987), far reaching effects 
of the dam, the reservoir, and their collective operations have since been identified and 
studied in an attempt to fully understand the changes that have resulted from the 
construction of Glen Canyon Dam. Richard Ingebretsen of the Glen Canyon Institute 
remains certain that, “we would not be allowed to build Glen Canyon Dam today” (Ward, 
2004), rather than during the late 1950s when no NEPA existed to require a scientific 
assessment of the environmental impacts of building dams. In order to predict what 
changes have occurred in the Colorado River Basin since the filling of Lake Powell, and 
attempt to envision what a restored Glen Canyon and Grand Canyon may look like, it is 
necessary to review the ecology of the ecosystem before the dam.  
The terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems of the immediately affected canyons were 
only briefly studied prior to Glen Canyon Dam. The consequence of this lack in scientific 
data is a less influential representation of what the river system would look like after the 
draining of Lake Powell because many anticipated changes are inherently speculative. In 
addition, the Colorado River’s ecosystem prior to the dam was already altered. Invasive 
fish species, several that are direct competitors or predators of the native fish, arrived in 
the Colorado River as early as the late 1800s (Carothers and House, 2000). Perhaps 
ecosystems within the Colorado River were in peril long before the conception of any 
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dam in Glen Canyon. Finally, scientists contend that the fragile and dynamic Grand 
Canyon below the dam has yet to reach a state of ecological equilibrium since the dam 
first altered its natural flow nearly a half century ago (Carothers and House, 2000). This 
also contributes to the difficulty involved with determining the influence of reservoir 
drainage on biological systems both above and below Glen Canyon Dam. Nevertheless, 
the ecological impacts are crucial in the debate that will decide the fate of Lake Powell.  
 The undeveloped and unregulated Colorado River in the Glen and Grand Canyons 
was a moody and seasonal waterway. Flows were characterized by being highly variable 
with heavy sediment loads and water temperatures that could pendulum by as much as 50 
degrees Fahrenheit (F) between winter and summer (Carothers and House, 2000). After 
the dam, however, water released (200-230 feet below the surface of the lake) was clear 
and cold without the spring floods that historically built beaches and restored habitat 
(Report to Congress: Operations of Glen Canyon Dam, 2001). Above the dam, a lake 
took the place of Glen Canyon and trapped the huge sediment loads. Below the dam, 
seasonal flows were eradicated and by the early 1970s temperatures of water discharged 
from the dam averaged 48 degrees F and never varied more than 4 degrees F between the 
seasons (Carothers and House, 2000). The result was a new ecosystem in both canyons, 
different from those of the pre-dam history.  
Pre-Dam Ecology 
I will begin at the bottom of the food chain to characterize the differences 
between the Colorado River before and after Lake Powell. Although never exactly 
measured in the Glen or Grand Canyon prior to the dam, primary productivity within the 
river was surely limited. This was a result of the constantly shifting and never stable river 
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bottom that was made up of steadily flowing fine sediments. Also, the mud-colored water 
blocked nearly all solar radiation into the water, limiting algae growth and in turn, the 
proliferation of macroinvertebrates and aquatic insects (Carothers and House, 2000). 
Therefore, the food upon which the native fish species in the Colorado River survived 
was relatively scarce and largely came from outside of the aquatic ecosystem, such as 
terrestrial insects (River and Dam Management, 1987). Above primary productivity, the 
native fish within the Colorado River were rare and were extremely well adapted to the 
unique river they called home.  
 The extreme variations in water flow, temperatures, and sediment load through 
the Glen and Grand Canyons that supported few aquatic insects or algae created a very 
harsh ecosystem that demanded specialized residents. Adapted fauna is just what 
evolved. Only two families and six genera of fishes are native to the Colorado River 
(Carothers and House, 2000). Six species are endemic (found nowhere else) to the Glen 
and Grand Canyon region. These fish within the swift and muddy Colorado are 
“remarkably large, muscular, and streamlined-with small, depressed skulls, and large, 
muscular keels on their backs providing them with the power and hydrodynamics to 
navigate the fastest major river in the United States” (Miller, 2000). Very small eyes and 
thick skin, nearly devoid of scales, reduces friction and allows these fish to weather 
sediment abrasion. Finally, these endemic species evolved long life spans to account for 
the unpredictable environment in which they live (Miller, 2000). In such conditions it is 
no surprise that only eight species of fishes lived in the canyons of the Colorado River at 
all, but such specialized creatures have proven to react poorly to complete regulation of 
flows and temperatures, while being less than ideal competitors as well.  
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 The natural Glen Canyon differed from the Grand Canyon downstream in many 
ways. Glen Canyon offered a less constricted river channel and lost much less elevation 
than the Grand Canyon, just two feet every mile through the Glen compared to eight feet 
per mile in Grand Canyon (Carothers and House, 2000). Needless to say, the river 
through Glen Canyon rarely constituted a rapid, while the turbulent nature of the Grand 
Canyon is still legendry. Soft Navajo Sandstone that was constantly eroding abutted this 
wider and gentler channel through Glen Canyon. The result was multilevel river terraces 
and a healthy array of sandbars that all supported a rich riparian habitat compared to that 
in the Grand Canyon (Carothers and House, 2000). Native plant species such as sandbar 
willow, baccharis, and arrowweed thrived alongside larger hackberrys, Gambel oaks, and 
Fremont cottonwoods. Non-native tamarisk was also present prior to the Glen Canyon 
Dam (Carothers and House, 2000). This vegetation constituted a dense row of shrubs and 
trees that lined Glen Canyon riverbanks, only to be destabilized by the moderate spring 
floods. Above the flood line and on terraces, more drought-tolerant, long-rooted shrubs 
were common. Within these various vegetation havens, as many as 197 animal species 
were likely to have existed according to expert estimates. The Glen Canyon 
Environmental Studies documented 96 species in the short time that scientists observed 
the area, and more were surely overlooked. Small mammals made up a fraction of the 
animal life, including beavers, as did birds, reptiles and amphibians (Carothers and 
House, 2000).  
 Prior to 1963 the Grand Canyon, on the other hand, resembled a much more 
desolate ecosystem. The combination of a narrow channel and steep gradient confined by 
less erosive cliffs, led to a different vegetative landscape than that seen in Glen Canyon. 
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Due to the steep and constricted nature of the Grand Canyon, spring floods aggressively 
climbed the banks, as high as thirty feet at times, and annually scoured any vegetation 
that attempted to take hold along the river’s edge (Carothers and House, 2000). The result 
was a “scour zone” where only grasses and low growing herbaceous vegetation lined the 
river for most of the year. The absence of permanent trees along the river banks likely 
could not have supported much of a bird population, and again, small mammals, reptiles, 
and amphibians existed, but in much smaller numbers than in Glen Canyon. Above the 
100,000 cfs waterline in the Grand Canyon a permanent band of vegetation consisted of 
acacia, mesquite, redbud, hackberry, and Apache plume, with desert scrub even higher 
(Carothers and House, 2000). This is no longer the case ever since the gates of Glen 
Canyon Dam were closed.  
Post-Dam Ecology 
 Obviously Lake Powell inundated the Glen Canyon and the two ecosystems are 
incomparably different. The vegetation and animals in Glen Canyon did not survive, but 
a new environment was created, and new species were allowed to flourish. Fish within 
Lake Powell are almost entirely non-native, although rarely is a native fish spotted in the 
extreme upper ends of the reservoir. Invasive fish species were put into the reservoir 
immediately following the dam’s completion in order to assure a healthy sport fishery. 
This stocking of non-native species continued until 1992 and in the five years after 1963, 
twelve million trout and five million bass were dumped into Lake Powell (Rogers, 2006). 
Now, over ten alien fish species account for most of the animal life in the lake, the most 
common being threadfin shad, smallmouth bass, striped bass, bluegill, green sunfish, 
channel catfish, carp, and walleye. The Bureau of Reclamation has used hydroacoustic 
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techniques to estimate the actual numbers and types of fishes in Lake Powell, and 
assumes that as many as one-half-billion non-native fishes live within Lake Powell 
(USBR Final Environmental Impact Statement, 2000). Where possible, vegetation is 
dominated by tamarisk and Russian thistle, two inhospitable and exotic species. 
Terrestrial animals are also scarce along the barren rock or desert shore of Lake Powell, 
but waterfowl have prospered and as a result, so too have their predator peregrine falcons. 
Bald eagles, almost never seen in the natural canyons, have increased in abundance since 
the arrival of Lake Powell and its plentiful fish population (Carothers and House, 2000). 
Downstream of the dam, however, the altered ecosystem that has resulted can be directly 
compared to what existed before the dam.  
 Glen Canyon Dam eliminates the normal high-peaking hydrograph that sculpted 
the harsh habitats of the Grand Canyon. As the reservoir filled over seventeen years, the 
flow through the Grand Canyon only exceeded 31,500 cfs on a few rare occasions, and 
the former yearly flows in excess of 90,000 cfs were not experienced again until the 
mismanaged floods of 1983 (Carothers and House, 2000). Under a regulated hydrograph, 
spring floods ceased scouring the banks of the Grand Canyon and permanent riparian 
plants, similar to those that previously lined the shores in Glen Canyon, took hold 
(Carothers and House, 2000). These species crowd the diminishing sandbars, as riparian 
real estate is limited in the steeper and more confined canyon. The new growth does 
provide for many more animals than previously existed in the Canyon, and “at least 
twenty-five species of birds have either expanded their range into the new habitat or 
increased in abundance” (Carothers and House, 2000). A new wealth of insects from the 
arrival of recent foliage has combined with a significant increase in primary productivity 
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within the river to vastly expand the food resources available to fish. This new in-stream 
algae is the result of now clear water that allows for greater light penetration and supports 
dozens of species of invertebrates (Carothers and House, 2000). Such drastic increases in 
food availability has impacted the density of fish within the Grand Canyon, while the 
now stable flows and cold water has affected the type of fish.  
 The purely native fish within the Colorado River include humpback chub, rundtail 
chub, specked dace, flannelmouth sucker, razorback sucker, bluehead sucker, Colorado 
pikeminnow, and bonytail. These fish had evolved to live in the variable Colorado River 
and had done so for millennia; however, warm-water non-native species arrived long 
before the Glen Canyon Dam and began to compete with the native populations. As 
Miller solemnly recalls, “historically, there were only eight species of fishes native to the 
Colorado River in Glen and Grand Canyons. Today five of the eight native species are 
endangered or have been extirpated, and of these five, only one species exists as a 
naturally reproducing species” (Miller, 2000). The endangered Colorado pikeminnow 
was wiped out likely because of the coldwater discharges and interruptions to their 
migratory behavior due to the dam. Also, the endangered razorback sucker, is assumed 
gone from Grand Canyon yet hardly persists downstream in Lake Mead (Carothers and 
House, 2000).  
Alien trout were purposefully introduced into the coldwater tributaries of Grand 
Canyon with the creation of Grand Canyon National Park in 1919, and non-native sport 
fish were aggressively stocked in Lake Mead after the completion of Hoover Dam in 
1935. Some of these fish inevitably ended up in the Glen and Grand Canyons. In fact, by 
the time Glen Canyon Dam was finished, fourteen species of non-native fish had already 
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been reported in a system that once held only eight native species (Carothers and House, 
2000), and twenty types of exotic fish now exist in the Colorado River (Miller, 2000). 
Glen Canyon Dam directly affected the native fish populations in the Grand Canyon. 
From the time when river temperatures stabilized near 48 degrees F in the 1970s, both 
native and non-native warm-water fish have suffered an overall decline, while coldwater 
species, namely rainbow and brown trout, have increased in numbers. The Grand 
Canyon's native species have difficulty spawning in the cold water that is released from 
Glen Canyon Dam. As a result, and due to competition from invasive fishes, struggling 
native fishes are largely limited to the Colorado River tributaries that still experience 
natural water temperatures and hydrographs (Miller, 2000). Such Colorado River 
tributaries have since become a refuge for the lingering native species. The Little 
Colorado River that joins the Grand Canyon about 75 miles below Glen Canyon Dam, 
supports the largest remaining population of endangered humpback chub, around 75,000 
mature fish (Carothers and House, 2000). Overall, the increasingly populous and 
regulated Colorado River below Glen Canyon Dam lends a competitive advantage to 
exotic fish species rather than the native fish species that are tailored to extreme 
variations in environmental conditions and thus little competition. Finally, the dam’s 
impacts can also be seen as the natural spawning migrations of many of the native fishes 
is blocked by the 710 foot-tall concrete structure of Glen canyon Dam that subsequently 
destroyed nearly 200 miles of native fishes’ prime habitat in Glen Canyon (Miller, 2000). 
With the knowledge of how the ecology within the Glen and Grand Canyons changed 
after the dam, possible effects of draining Lake Powell can be inferred. 
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Ecology After Decommissioning Glen Canyon Dam 
 The Glen Canyon Institute has suggested that the reservoir reasonably could be 
drained in ten to fifteen years. Over this time frame drastic ecosystem changes would be 
minimized, but still enormous. It must also be kept in mind that any action performed 
today must comply with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Clean Water Act, National 
Environmental Policy Act, Law of the River, and other pertinent laws unless Congress 
legislated otherwise, which is a complicated proposition (Carothers and House, 2000). 
This means that environmental effects of the lake’s drawdown would have to be taken 
into account when designing a release scheme. Most likely to be affected by the 
decommissioning of Glen Canyon Dam will be listed species that are either endangered 
or threatened according to the ESA, a broad and powerful piece of legislation that can 
prohibit such an undertaking if certain species were likely to be harmed.  
In this case, the endangered humpback chub is the species in question, as draining 
Lake Powell is believed by some experts to be “the death knell for the most significant 
remaining recruiting population of humpback chub in existence” (Carothers and House, 
2000). A careful drawdown of Lake Powell would certainly be a priority, but some 
factors are simply out of our hands. Until 230 feet below the top of the dam the reservoir 
could be emptied through the penstocks, and then through the river outlet works that are 
another 16 feet lower on the dam. Releasing any water below the level of the outlet works 
would require either re-opening the two 41-foot-diameter diversion tunnels that were 
used during dam construction or excavating new ones (Carothers and House, 2000). The 
result of this stage-based draining regime would be abruptly changing temperatures at 
various points of the drawdown. Initially, releases would remain cold, but would warm as 
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the reservoir level dropped and water was drawn from nearer the surface. The location of 
withdrawal would inevitably have to shift to the bottom of the reservoir at some point and 
release temperatures would abruptly decrease, only to gradually warm again (Carothers 
and House, 2000). These dramatic temperature shifts would certainly stress the Grand 
Canyon species, but another concern during the later stages of draining Lake Powell 
would be poor water quality.  
From nearly absent currents, especially at great depths, Lake Powell is chemically 
stratified, with a large body of saline water accumulating on the bottom. This region of 
high salinity stagnates over time, becoming increasingly anaerobic as levels of dissolved 
oxygen decrease. Eventually the only life forms that can survive at depth are anaerobic 
bacteria that produce such toxic products as hydrogen sulfide and ammonia (Carothers 
and House, 2000). If the ecosystem within the Grand Canyon prevailed through 
temperature swings and dangerously low oxygen levels during drawdown, then the 
unfathomable number of non-native fishes from Lake Powell that would be swept into 
the Grand Canyon may be the final and most testing risk of decommissioning Glen 
Canyon Dam. Steven Carothers and Dorthy House estimate that “during certain stages of 
reservoir depletion, upwards of 250,000 non-native fishes could enter Grand Canyon 
from the reservoir each week” fearing “such an onslaught would overwhelm downstream 
habitats and organisms, including humpback chub and the resources essential for its 
survival” (2000). Not only would this harm to the humpback chub violate the ESA, but 
the most significant remaining population of humpback chub in existence is found in the 
Grand Canyon and the species as a whole may face certain extinction without the Grand 
Canyon faction (Carothers and House, 2000). Primary and secondary productivity and 
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fish populations eventually would stabilize at low levels as the lake species died out, but 
this may come at the cost of the humpback chub. Other native species that were likely 
wiped out in the Grand Canyon during the drawdown period would have to reestablish a 
population in the main river channel from tributary niches and vigorously compete with 
non-native residents.  
In addition, a return to highly variable temperatures and inflated sediment loads 
from lake deposits would be feared to result in a collapse of the aquatic food chain. What 
few well-adapted native fish remained may enjoy an advantage in such circumstances, 
but other warm-water invasive fishes would also survive and occupy habitat that would 
otherwise belong to the native species (Carothers and House, 2000). Extremely swift 
flows through the diversion tunnels around the dam may still inhibit fish from upstream 
passage as well, just as the dam once did. Bald eagles and peregrine falcons would 
decrease in numbers when the river returned to natural, as swallows, swifts and rainbow 
trout would largely vanish; yet both of these iconic birds have experienced a healthy 
rebound from near extinction and neither species would be affected as a whole. Other 
ecological effects of draining Lake Powell would be far-reaching and difficult to foresee. 
For instance, habitats and species associated with seeps and springs would thrive as the 
massive quantities of water stored in Glen Canyon's sandstone walls flowed to the surface  
(Johnson).  
Endangered and native species tend to assume a central role in debates that 
propose an ecologically sensitive action, and the unique species that are found only in the 
Colorado River Basin are no exception. Counter-intuitively to many, draining Lake 
Powell may well accelerate the loss of native species; just as it is hard to believe, but 
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possible that creating the dam in the first place could have prevented non-native warm-
water fishes from gaining the upper hand in the main stem of the river. Therefore, the 
dam may have helped the already troubled native fish endure an invasion from exotic 
warm-water species even as it degraded their habitat. The three other Colorado River 
fishes protected with endangered status, razorback sucker, Colorado pikeminnow, and 
bonytail, on the other hand, would likely not be directly affected by draining the 
reservoir. All three species have disappeared from the Grand Canyon and probably never 
were common there anyway (Carothers and House, 2000).  
If Glen Canyon Dam was initially condemned because it destroyed the wonders 
within a pristine wilderness, opposition to the dam now cite the far-reaching ecological 
consequences as major reasons for the call to restore Glen Canyon. Former Secretary of 
the Interior Bruce Babbitt recalls, “I was up here when this dam was built in the '50s, and 
at the time it didn't occur to anybody the relation between the dam and what would 
happen downstream” (Miller, 2000), in a statement that captures the central problem of 
the Glen Canyon Dam. It is commonly accepted that a natural ecosystem is a sustainable 
one, and therefore protecting or restoring a river’s natural hydrograph, where seasonal 
low and high discharges return to historical cycles is necessary; but in this specific 
instance, humans may need to further intervene on the behalf of select and troubled 
species. Draining Lake Powell would restore much of the Colorado River to a more 
natural condition, but this is likely at the cost of native and endangered species. So far in 
this discussion, I have assumed minimal human intervention in cleanup or restoration 
after the decommissioning of the dam; however, harboring and then re-introducing 
species such as the humpback chub after the most drastic ecological changes of the 
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drawdown have subsided may be the answer to preserving the species as a whole. Under 
such a scenario, during which care should be taken to ensure the survival of all native 
species in the Colorado River, draining Lake Powell again looks desirable. 
 
Conclusion 
 One trend among humankind is clear: we have an insatiable appetite for 
conquering the natural world, and this often leads to unintended consequences. There is 
no doubt that the Bureau of Reclamation, in a Herculean effort, brought much of the 
West’s water resources under control, at least for the time being. Yet, as has happened 
countless times before from various endeavors, the unanticipated downfalls of these large 
dams that stall nature’s onslaught are just beginning to be contemplated and understood. 
In the case of Glen Canyon Dam, the real cost is not only 272 million 1963 dollars, 
maintenance costs of $11-29 million per year, and 1.2 million acres of drowned America 
(Sibley, 2000). Other intrinsic values are often overlooked. The purpose of an objective 
evaluation such as the one that I have conducted is to uncover these convoluted 
consequences and separate then from the often-intertwined mess of benefits and 
uncertainties alike. Some of the seemingly cut-and-dry economic costs and benefits of 
Glen Canyon Dam are currently so murky, that perhaps billions of dollars can be 
sincerely incorporated into both arguments, not to mention an endless stream of related 
impacts that would greatly influence support for or against draining Lake Powell. Clearly, 
before we hastily tear down or decommission dams such as the one in Glen Canyon, 
many debates like the discussion outlined above must be settled. Still, we won’t be 
ensured safe haven from another host of unforeseen effects. Glen Canyon Dam is unique 
in the fact that it is the first, and still one of the only, dams of its stature that may actually 
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be decommissioned, but the nature of being a pioneer implies that much more is left to 
speculation. Throughout this paper I have divided the anticipated effects of draining Lake 
Powell along the cleanest lines that I could find, yet the complex interdependencies of 
such a question are still evident.  
Decommissioning Glen Canyon Dam would be harmful to society through 
consequences such as the loss of clean, load-following hydroelectric power and the 
resulting need for a polluting thermal plant. Revenues from related tourism and power 
would be lost or shifted, and one misstep during the drawdown could result in devastation 
to multiple, already fatigued, native fish species. Political tempers would flare if the only 
major storage facility in the frequently neglected Upper Basin were drained, and Glen 
Canyon would take decades or more to be restored. This seemingly daunting list, 
however, is overshadowed by the benefits that would be enjoyed, directly and indirectly 
through a restored Glen Canyon based on my research and comparisons.   
Simply the feasibility of draining Lake Powell immediately makes Glen Canyon 
Dam a candidate for scrutiny. Thus, after answering the question of how, more time can 
be devoted to studying why Lake Powell should be drained. Here is where the debate 
splits, and for one simple reason: the lack of comprehensive and primary studies of the 
possible effects of decommissioning Glen Canyon Dam in the detail necessary to settle 
the central question of this paper. Such studies are costly, and no money has ever been 
made available to carry out the research. In fact, just the opposite is the case, as 
concerned members of Congress inserted a rider to the 1999 and 2000 appropriations 
bills to slow the momentum of the Sierra Club’s proposal. The latter rider explicitly 
blocked the prospect of money being “used to study or implement any plan to drain Lake 
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Powell or to reduce the water level of the lake” (Miller, 2000). Cursory speculations and 
models can be compiled to form an enlightened opinion on the matter, but until the costs 
and benefits of decommissioning Glen Canyon Dam are thoroughly and explicitly 
analyzed for that very same purpose, predictions will run amuck into every facet of 
possibilities. Former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt encompasses the modern 
environmentalist’s view of large dams, challenging “dam owners everywhere—including 
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers and other federal 
agencies—to defend themselves, to demonstrate by hard facts, not sentiment and myth, 
that continued operation of a dam is in the public interest.” And acknowledging that 
“This is especially true of Glen Canyon Dam, a dam built on assumptions of necessity 
and with a blind eye to the environment and our changing values” (Babbitt, 1998). 
Babbitt’s criticism of Glen Canyon Dam illustrates the impetus for the desire to drain 
Lake Powell. The Colorado River Storage Project Act was devised at a time during which 
an utter absence in the understanding of the dam and its effects on the downstream 
environment had been made evident. It is the shifting of views though, away from the 
narrow-minded conquests of the big-dam era, and towards ecological, and even 
biosphere-wide, notions of sustainability that brings the current and future benefits of 
Glen Canyon Dam into question. 
For the above reason, I considered the Sierra Club’s proposal and, from the 
current data available, concluded that decommissioning the Glen Canyon Dam is best. In 
hopes of avoiding complication I analyzed the costs and benefits of draining Lake Powell 
assuming minimal human intervention beyond the act of bypassing the dam. It is naive to 
believe however, that humans will not contribute to the restoration of the affected 
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ecosystems. Therefore, a condition must be met in order for the draining of Lake Powell 
to remain on the “to do” list in my opinion. Power generation from the dam is already 
reduced due to environmental concern; sediment will eventually fill in Lake Powell; the 
reservoir’s intended purpose as a storage facility for the upper basin will not be utilized 
for years to come; and recreation in the desert Southwest will continue after the 
disappearance of Lake Powell. For these, and other reasons outlined in the paper, 
draining Lake Powell makes sense. The notion of inflicting certain harm on few native 
species downstream concerns me, yet a remedy may lie in a concerted effort to 
reintroduce the humpback chub to the Grand Canyon well after the drawdown of the 
reservoir and the associated dangers have mostly passed. Other services are certain to be 
aided by conservation ecologists, yet the prevention of species extinction is important in a 
successful and supported proposal to decommission Glen Canyon Dam. Given enough 
time, aquatic and terrestrial habitats above and below the dam would be expected to 
resemble pre-dam conditions, or at least develop a new natural sustainability, but the fact 
remains that the original goals of the dam are no longer consistent with the recently 
recognized environmental consequences of all large dams. For this reason, the Glen 
Canyon Dam has become the subject of debate in many other cost-benefit analyses’, the 
results of which should seal the fate of Lake Powell by decommissioning Glen Canyon 
Dam.  
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